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INTRODUCTION 
Until the last several decades, courts have been reluctant to dis-
turb or regulate the relationship between employer and employee. 
It was viewed in much the same way as a marriage - a private 
relationship, subject to internal controls. Today the pendulum has 
begun to swing in the opposite direction as the common law doc-
trine of employment-at-wilP develops into an emerging and con-
troversial issue in labor relations. 
Through judge-made exceptions and legislative enactments, the 
principle of employment-at-will has been substantially eroded. 
Nevertheless, as an analysis of the cases will show, these responses 
have been, for the most part, improbable, spasmodic or unpredict-
able, engendering little con census on the feasibility of or approach 
to safeguarding the interests of unprotected employees.2 Dis-
turbing questions regarding judicial jurisdiction and consideration 
of legislation intended to protect employees from the adverse ef-
fects of unjust termination have yet to be adequately decided. 
Legislative attempts to resolve the problem have not encoun-
tered much success. An effort was made in 1980 when the Corpo-
rate Democracy Act was introduced in Congress.3 The bill, which 
would have amended the National Labor Relations Act, sought to 
protect employees in the security of their employment by limiting 
the right of employers to discharge freely.· Proponents viewed the 
1. "Employment-at-will" means that employment relationships of unspecified duration 
are presumed to be at the will of either the employee or the employer. Either party may 
terminate the relationship without notice or cause. 
2. Workers covered by collective bargaining agreements or individual employment con-
tracts are generally afforded adequate protection through grievance and arbitration 
procedures. 
3. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
4. The proposed amendatory language incorporated into Title IV of the bill, "Rights of 
Employees," stated that it was a policy of the United States to "protect employees in the 
HeinOnline -- 1986 Det. C.L. Rev. 3 1986
1986] At-Will Employees 3 
legislation as a vehicle through which a more complete form of jus-
tice would be extended to employees not protected by collective 
bargaining grievance procedures. The opposition characterized the 
proposed legislative solution as an unacceptable encroachment on 
the employer's unrestrained right to terminate. This coalition ef-
fectively combined to swiftly defeat the bill at the end of the 96th 
Congress. . 
From the reception this bill has received in Congress, few legisla-
tors seem willing to impose limitations on entrepreneurial freedom 
by supporting measures which curtail the employer's right to ter-
minate at-will employees. Ii Nor is it likely that this situation will 
change as federal legislation in this area does not appear immi-
nent. In 1982 the International Labor Organization,6 the United 
Nation's tripartite organization, passed a Convention' that pro-
tected nonunionized employees from discharge absent just cause.s 
The United States Government, favoring a non-binding approach 
to the termination of employment problem, joined employer dele-
gates from other industrialized countries to defeat the Convention. 
They succeeded in obtaining a watered-down version of the origi-
nal recommendation.9 Although the Convention eventually passed, 
the failure to provide an enforcement mechanism rendered the 
security of their employment" by precluding dismissals predicated on the exercise of a legal, 
civil or constitutional right, or the failure to engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of 
employment. 
5. Although experts' views differ, the weight of authority suggests that such legislation 
would not have calamitous consequences for the labor union movement. European countries 
which have employment-at-will legislation generally have strong union forces. The likeli-
hood of federal or state legislation in the United States may ultimately turn on whether the 
union movement combines with other prevailing forces to extend job security rights to the 
unprotected private sector. 
6. The principal purpose of the International Labor Organization, an arm of the United 
Nations, is to develop and monitor international labor relations. It also serves as a network 
base for training and providing technical assistance to employers and unions. 
7. There are two types of measures on which ILO delegates vote. The nonbinding type, 
called a Recommendation, is intended to be strictly advisory, guiding national policy, legis-
lation and practice. The other measure, a Convention, is binding, and has the effect of a 
formal treaty under national law. 
8. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., 1982 SPECIAL REPORT ON THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-
WILL ISSUE 121 (1983). 
9. The original text placed the burden of proof on the employer to justify the termina-
tion. The ensuing compromise imposed the burden of proof on the employer only if a valid 
reason for the termination could not be established. Managerial employees were also ex-
cluded from the scope of coverage. 
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compromise provisions virtually ineffective. 
These setbacks on the federal level reflect the mood of the state 
legislatures as well. Between 1981 and 1983, Colorado, Michigan, 
Wisconsin and Pennsylvania introduced legislation which re-
stricted the right of employers to terminate employees where just 
cause did not prevail. The fierce battle between vested interests 
predestined the defeat of the legislation; these states were unable 
to surmount the obstacles created by the coalition of business and 
labor interests. 
While legislative efforts to codify just cause terminations have 
failed, state courts have attempted to dismantle the at-will doc-
trine on public policy and implied contract grounds. To counteract 
this recent tide of judicial activism, employers are making changes 
in the workplace. Employee handbooks are being edited to ensure 
that statements regarding continued employment are omitted. In-
ternal grievance procedures are being established to resolve em-
ployee termination disputes. Prospective employees are also being 
asked to sign agreements before hire, stating their understanding 
of the at-will nature of the employment relationship and agreeing 
to forego any litigation regarding termination. lo Finally, when ter-
mination does result, employees are being offered substantial sev-
erance packages to dissuade them from challenging the termina-
tion in court. It appears, however, that these developments provide 
only a reaction, not a remedy, to the at-will conundrum. Private 
. employee job rights thus remain tertiary at best. 
Commentators and scholars who have addressed this subject 
maintain fundamental philosophical differences regarding the ap-
plications, exceptions and limitations of the employment-at-will 
doctrine.11 The legal theories proposed to remove the sting of the 
doctrine's strict enforcement include: (a) implied contract (implicit 
10. Ledl v. Quick Pik Food Stores, Inc., 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 52.9 (1984). 
11. For a more extensive discussion of the employment-at-will principle see generally: 
Blades, Employment-at- Will vs. Indiuidual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of 
Employment Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Estreicher, At-Will Employment and 
the Problem of Unjust Dismissal: The Appropriate Judicial Response, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 146 
(1982). Howlett, Due Process for Nonunionized Employees: A Practical Proposal, 32 PROC. 
ANN. MEETING INDUS. REI.. REsEARCH A. 64 (1980); Robins, Unfair Dismissal: Emerging Is-
sue in the Law of Arbitration as Dispute Resolution Alternative for the Nonunion 
Workforce, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437 (1984); Steiber, Employment-at- Will: An Issue for 
the 1980's, 36 PROC. ANN. MEETING INDUS. REI.. RESEARCH A. (1983); Summers, Individual 
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976). 
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in each employment relationship is a promise of continued employ-
ment, with termination requiring cause); (b) tortious conduct (abu-
sive or oppressive discharges triggered by retaliation are contrary 
to public policy); and (c) constitutional safeguards (state action at-
taches to the corporate exercise of economic power, satisfying the 
requirement necessary to sustain a violation of free speech and as-
sociational rights under the first amendment). However, most of 
the proposals have either been rejected outright or utilized only on 
a limited basis. As a result, the courts have failed to adopt a uni-
fied approach, managing only to carve out isolated exceptions, 
fearful of straying too far into unfamiliar territory. 
This Article provides an overview of the origins, modification 
and refinement of the traditional employment-at-will doctrine by 
highlighting and analyzing decisional law. Legislative attempts to 
bridge the innumerable gaps created by this case law, and to eradi-
cate the harshness of the strict application of the at-will doctrine, 
are reviewed. With the "expectation" that the "pro-employee 
movement" will solidify, if not expand, in the next several years, 
the author presents and elaborates on an arbitration scheme, 
parallelling the collective bargaining archetype, to be used in the 
resolution of unfair dismissal cases. Finally, perspectives and spec-
ulations are offered regarding the future of the employment-at-will 
doctrine. 
I. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL: EARLY 
DEVELOPMENT 
In 1884, a Tennessee court described the concept of employ-
ment-at-will: 
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they 
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for 
no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlaw-
ful act per se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in the same 
way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the 
employer. II 
This brief but cogent summary of the termination option, in the 
absence of collective or individual contracts, elucidates the under-
12. Payne v. Western & Alt. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884)(overruled on other 
grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915». 
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lying philosophy and legal effect of the employment-at-will doc-
trine. In upholding the doctrine, the court reinforced the basic rule 
of mutuality of obligation - neither party is contractually bound 
to maintain the employment relationship. Termination by either 
party could occur with impunity.13 This rule survived for decades 
after it was first articulated, rendering the employment relation-
ship impervious to any form of external regulation. 
The employer's unrestrained freedom to discharge was given re-
newed life in Adair v. United States,1" a case which reaffirmed the 
rationale of mutality and cloaked the employer's freedom to termi-
nate at-will employees with constitutional protection. The Court 
found unconstitutional a congressional act which made it a crimi-
nal offense for a carrier engaged in interstate commerce to dis-
charge an employee because of union membership. Justice Harlan, 
speaking for the majority, observed that "[t]he act [was] a bold 
attempt to regulate an ordinary relation of life - of master and 
servant - one hitherto supposed to be entirely within state con-
trol."lIi The Court further stated: 
'It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse 
business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests 
upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice. With 
his reasons neither the public nor third persons have any legal concern.'IS 
(emphasis added.) 
According to the Court, the legislation disturbed the mutality of 
obligations theory, and represented "an arbitrary interference with 
the liberty of contract which no government [could] legally justify 
in a free land."17 "[T]he liberty of contract relating to labor in-
cludes both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as 
the other to sell labor."18 
13. The mutuality of obligation theory is an outgrowth of the bilateral contract where 
reciprocal promises which are legally sufficient are deemed binding and enforceable. Con-
tract law does not regard the mutuality of obligation as a separate requirement for estab-
lishing a valid contract but rather as a test of consideration for mutual promises. Thus, if 
the employee has rendered services in excess of his regular and required services, an agree-
ment will be enforced on behalf of the employee though he maintains the continuing right 
to terminate the relationship at any time. 
14. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
15. [d. at 163. 
16. [d. at 173. 
17. [d. at 175. 
18. [d. at 174. 
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In reaching its decision that the act infringed upon the em-
ployer's personal liberty and right of property arising under the 
fifth amendment of the federal Constitution, the court vested the 
property right in the employer and not in the employee.19 Thus, 
Congress could not, under the guise of regulating interstate com-
merce, control the employment relationship as well. The Court 
spoke decisively when it stated, in the final paragraphs of the opin-
ion, that arbitrary actions which illegally invade the personal lib-
erty and property rights of the employer would not be tolerated.20 
The Harlan opinion reveals a basic sensitivity to economic lib-
erty and freedom of enterprise. Admittedly, the historical and po-
litical setting of the times enhanced the Court's vulnerability to-
ward elevating the freedom of contract to a constitutional property 
right. Traced to the Magna Carta, the due process terminology of 
the fifth amendment was, in early judicial history, frequently in-
voked to determine procedural questions. The notion that due pro-
cess could be used to limit the exercise of legislative authority in 
protecting substantive rights assumed recognition and prominence 
after the legislative police power concept developed. Thus, any so-
cial legislation which imposed arbitrary or unreasonable restric-
tions by the government constituted a substantive due process vio-
lation, and hence it was unconstitutional. 
Blunting the effect of the majority opinion was a compelling dis-
sent by Justice McKenna. Observing that the liberty guaranteed 
by the fifth amendment "is not a liberty free from all restraints 
and limitations, and this must be so or government could not be 
beneficially exercised in many cases,"21 he argued that the liberty 
of forming business relationships was indeed subject to the com-
merce clause authority of Congress. He also submitted that, where 
deemed in the public interest, the exercise of authority under the 
commerce clause assumed predominance over the provisions of the 
fifth amendment. 
In his discussion of the purpose of the statute, Justice McKenna 
noted that the act contained an arbjtration scheme for the adjust-
ment of employee grievances which would "prevent strikes and the 
public disorder and derangement of business that may be conse-
19. Id. at 180. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 182. 
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quent upon them . . . . "22 This, he concluded, was a proper and 
legitimate legislative purpose, falling squarely within the rubric of 
Congress' power to legislate interstate commerce. 
The rigidity of the Supreme Court's decision in Adair was tem-
pered by the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 
1935.23 The centerpiece provision of the Act, section 7, encouraged 
collective bargaining and protected the workers' exercise of free-
dom of association and self-organization. Dismissals predicated on 
the exercise of section 7 rights were repugnant to the tenets of the 
Act. Had Adair been decided subsequent to the passage of the Act, 
the result probably would have been different. The union member-
ship could have been viewed as the primary, if not exclusive basis 
for discharge, and as such, a clear violation of section 7 rights. 
Nevertheless, the passage of the National Labor Relations Act 
symbolized the increased recognition that eliminating the cause of 
obstruction to the free flow of commerce arising out of industrial 
strife24 was in the public interest. 
The NLRA was the first chip from the bedrock of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, confirmed when the Supreme Court repudi-
ated the constitutional protection of the employer's absolute right 
to discharge by declaring the Wagner Act constitutional in NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.2G The mutuality of obligations 
theory which balanced the rights of employers and employees to 
terminate the employment relationship was no longer applicable 
without limitation. The protections afforded an employee by the 
Wagner Act mandated continuation of the employment relation-
ships if it could be shown that the primary basis for employee ter-
mination was anti-union animus. Legislation was beginning to im-
pinge on the employment-at-will doctrine and redefine, albeit 
under limited circumstances, its boundaries. 
22. [d. at 184. 
23. Otherwise known as the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970)(amended 1947 and 
1959). The two amendments to the original Act, the Labor-Management Relations Act of 
1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
(Landrum-Griffin Act) have enhanced and clarified the protected rights set forth in the orig-
inal legislation. 
24. Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)(amended 1947 and 1959). 
25. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Court distin-
guished between the "normal" exercise of the right of discharge and the use of the right of 
discharge to coerce and intimidate employees from engaging in collective bargaining, hold-
ing that the purpose of the legislation was to preclude only the latter. 
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The common law doctrine was revisited in Geary v. United 
States Steel Corp.26 The plaintiff, a tubular products salesman, 
filed an action against his former employer, seeking compensatory 
and punitive damages. Framed as a wrongful discharge, the em-
ployee contended that his termination was retaliatory, caused by 
his expressed reservations regarding the unsafe nature of the em-
ployer's product.27 
Acknowledging that the power of an employer to terminate at-
will was explicitly recognized in the Restatement of Torts,2S and in 
general accord with the weight of authority, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania conceded that· economic conditions had radically 
changed since the employment-at-will doctrine had come into exis-
tence. The broader question presented by the factual matrix was 
whether the time had come to judicially restrict the employer's un-
fettered right to discharge his employees. 
In its consideration of the case, the court did not focus on 
whether the employer knew or should have known the probable 
harmful consequences of the discharge, but whether the employer's 
conduct constituted specific intent to harm or accomplish an ulte-
rior purpose.29 The court's conclusion produced yet another inter-
esting permutation of case law: 
The most natural inference from the chain of events recited in the com-
plaint is that Geary had made a nuisance of himself, and the company 
discharged him to preserve administrative order in its own house. This 
hardly amounts to an 'ulterior purpose' much less to 'disinterested ma-
levolence' .... 30 
Although a public policy argument was made regarding the em-
ployer,s efforts to protect the public from unsafe products, the 
court disposed of it by concluding that the employee did not pos-
sess expertise in this area,31 nor did his responsibilities include 
making judgments about the safety of products entering the 
stream of commerce.32 For a justifiable claim to prevail, a clear 
mandate of public policy had to be violated. 
26. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). 
27. [d. at 174, 319 A.2d at 175. 
28. [d. at 177, 319 A.2d at 179. 
29. [d. at 175, 319 A.2d at 177. 
30. [d. at 177, 319 A.2d at 179. 
31. [d. at 178, 319 A.2d at 179. 
32. [d. 
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The seeds of what would soon become a public policy exception, 
however, took shape in the dissenting opinion.ss Forcefully articu-
lating the hazards of the majority opinion, Justice Roberts ex-
pressed the desirability of balancing the employer's right to dis-
charge with the public interest. An employee who seeks "to protect 
his employer's reputation by requesting withdrawal of a defective 
and dangerous product ... [should not have] his loyalty challenged 
and acknowledged by a dismissal. "S4 Moreover, "the majority . . . 
fails to perceive that the prevention of injury is a fundamental and 
highly desirable objective of our society."slI Where public interest 
is so overwhelmingly at stake, the right to freely discharge cannot 
be strictly enforced. 
One of the principal concerns raised in the majority opinion was 
that by allowing a public policy exception, the inexorable result -
an avalanche of lawsuits - would bear heavily on the judicial sys-
tem. The increased caseload would be compounded by a shifting 
burden of proof requirement, rendering more difficult the decision-
making function of the courts. The resultant body of law would be 
amorphous and ill-defined, incapable of providing more than a 
small measure of solace to the displaced worker. 
The court's temerity in disturbing the employer's absolute right 
to discharge save for clear public policy violations has been ex-
amined by a number of commentators. Professor Summers, in one 
of the authoritative articles in the field,se states that "mutuality, as 
used in the court decision's context is a spurious concept, neither 
required as a legal principle nor acceptable as a social principle, 
and it can scarcely explain the courts' decisions. The more plausi-
ble explanation is that the courts are genuinely fearful of the 'un-
charted territory,."s7 The court's recalcitrance in permitting a 
damage remedy for employees subject to the overreaching tactics 
33. Justice Roberts dissenting, declared: "It is a public policy which here qualifies the 
right. When a seemingly absolute right or the conditions of an existing relationship are con-
trary to public policy, then a court is obligated to qualify that right in light of current 
reality." [d. at 182, 319 A.2d at 183. 
34. [d. at 180, 319 A.2d at 181. 
35. [d. 
36. Summers, Protecting All Employees Against Unjust Dismissal, 58 HARV. Bus. L. 
REV. 132 (1980). 
37. [d. at 137. Summers concluded that the burden of proof problems and the increase 
in the number of cases render unlikely the passage of legislation to protect against arbitrary 
or abusive dismissals. [d. at 139. 
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of the abusive employer suggests the viability of the theory. 
Despite the court's misgivings in extending protection to at-will 
employees, the Geary case represented an important development 
for those advocating limitations on the employer's unbridled right 
to terminate. The majority opinion conceded that the sacronsanct 
relationship between employee and employer was a proper subject 
of inquiry and regulation for the courts. A slight, but clear shift 
toward protecting the job rights of unorganized workers had oc-
curred. The path was now clear for further development and 
refinement. 
II. THE EROSION OF THE DOCTRINE 
A. The Public Policy Exception 
One of the most recognized legal theories modifying the at-will 
doctrine and extending the boundaries of employee rights is public 
policy.38 This exception is triggered when termination contravenes 
clearly mandated or fundamental pUbli'c policy. 
Public policy, however, is an elusive term, causing several courts 
to reject it as an exception altogether, characterizing it "too 
vague. "39 But for courts which have been able to define the accept-
able contours of public policy, the majority of cases fall into three 
categories: 1) discharge for whistle-blowing; 2) discharge in retalia-
tion for exercising a vested or statutory right; and 3) discharge in 
retaliation for refusing to commit an illegal act. In each instance, 
the philosophical underpinning of the courts is that the employer's 
action constitutes the kind of egregious conduct which undermines 
legislative intent, and thus cannot be. judicially sanctioned. 
38. The following states recognize this exception to the at-will doctrine: California, Con-
necticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia 
(federal bankruptcy court), Washington, West Virginia. 
39. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) See also Bender Ship 
Repair v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d. 594 (Ala.1980) (upholding the termination of an employee for 
serving on a jury); Catanoa v. Eastern Airlines, 381 So. 2d. 265 (Ala.1980) (rejecting a public 
policy argument as too general to permit analysis); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W. 2d 
811 (Ky.1977) (rejecting the argument that education was an established public policy by 
holding that law school attendance was a private concern best left to the legislature to de-
termine otherwise). 
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1. Discharge for Whistle-blowing 
This cause of action includes a broad spectrum of circum-
stances40 where the employee discloses an employer's violation of 
criminal and civil law. As the name connotes, this exception more 
so than the others is a legislative creation. A few states, including 
Michigan,41 have passed statutes which protect employees from be-
ing discharged for exposing the legal violations of others. 
Jurisdictions with no legislative guidelines have taken differing 
positions on the issue of protection for the at-will employees. 
While equitable arguments such as unequal bargaining power and 
constitutional questions involving due process and adequate notice 
playa limited role in the judicial decision-making process of these 
courts, the majority hold that a strict construction of public policy 
interests, as enunciated by the legislature, is mandated. 
Not only have these courts declined to stray from the public pol-
icy path, they have also refused to set it. Murphy u. American 
Home Products Corp.,42 typifies the rationale behind the judicial 
hesita:ncy to usurp the legislative prerogative of formulating public 
policy. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that those juris-
dictions which no longer support the common law at-will rule have 
done so merely to avoid or alleviate harsh results, and "if the rule 
of non-liability for termination of at-will employment is to be tem-
pered, it should be accomplished through a principled statutory 
scheme, adopted after opportunity for public ventilation, rather 
than in consequence of judicial resolution of the partisan argu-
40. In addition to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which protects employees 
from discharge for opposing an employer's discriminatory actions, other examples include: 
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)(objecting to an 
employer's mislabeling of his own products); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 
193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978)(uncovering the criminal activities of a management employee); 
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978)(reporting to the authorities an 
employer's violation of banking laws). 
41. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-369 (1981 & Supp. 1985). Under the 
Whistle blowers' Protection Act which applies to private and public employers, employees 
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that they were discharged as a direct result 
of their reporting a violation or suspected violation of the law. 
The only other states which have statutes modifying the at-will doctrine are New York 
(N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 740-1 to 740-7 (McKinney 1985» and South Dakota (S.D. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. § 60-1-3 (1978» (establishing a presumption that employment is to continue for a 
period of time defined by the pay interval). 
42. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). 
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ments of individual adversarial litigants. "'3 
However, where the at-will doctrine impinges on the political 
and associational freedoms guaranteed by state and federal consti-
tutions, courts may be more inclined to rely on public policy dic-
tates to protect first amendment rights, even though they are not 
clearly mandated. In Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.," the 
United States Court of Appeals found the discharge of a private 
employee who refused to support his employer's lobbying efforts 
actionable, reaffirming that "free communication is one of the most 
invaluable rights of man."u Public policy took on a less immutable 
appearance when the court concluded that conduct which "strikes 
at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties and responsibilities," 
implicates public policy." 
The requirement of state action was adroitly circumvented by 
the court, noting that "the protection of important political free-
doms . . . goes well beyond the question whether the threat comes 
from state or private bodies."" Corporations which have derived 
their status from the state cannot use their economic power to ex-
act concessions from employees or coerce them to conform their 
opinions to the "corporate political agenda."'8 
Absent the interplay of constitutional freedoms, or a special 
whistleblowers' statute, judicial protection is rarely afforded. A re-
cent Maryland case exemplifies the troublesome questions which 
the courts must tackle. In Adler v. American Standard Corp.,'D the 
Maryland Court of Appeals held that an employee who was dis-
charged in retaliation for articulating the improper and illegal 
practices of the employer, did not make out a claim for wrongful 
discharge. Although the court agreed that a strict interpretation of 
the at-will doctrine was no longer economically feasible, it declined 
to extend protection in this case because plaintiff did not factually 
document the averments in his complaint. 
43. [d. at 298, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 238. 
44. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). 
45. [d. The court used the federal Constitution and state constitution as the sources of 
authority to establish the "cognizable expression of public policy." [d. at 899. 
46. [d. at 899. 
47. [d. at 900. The court found the implication of "important public policy wherever the 
power to hire and fire is utilized to dictate the terms of employee political activities." [d. at 
900. 
48. [d. at 901. 
49. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). 
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Despite the conclusion reached by the court, an interesting anal-
ysis of the competing interests in a wrongful discharge case was 
offered: 
[A]n at-will employee's interest in job security, particularly when contin-
ued employment is threatened not by genuine dissatisfaction 'with job 
performance but because the employee has refused to act in an unlawful 
manner or attempted to perform a statutorily prescribed duty, is deserv-
ing of recognition. Equally to be considered is that the employer has an 
important interest in being able to discharge an at-will employee when-
ever it would be beneficial to his business. Finally, society as a whole has 
an interest in ensuring that its laws and important public policies are not 
contravened. Any modification of the at-will rule must take into account 
all of these interests. GO 
2. Exercising a Vested or Statutory Right 
It is well-settled that the employment-at-will doctrine cannot be 
used to defeat certain individual rights which have been guaran-
teed by the legislature. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the 
freedom from discharge grounded on sex, race or religion. Despite 
the court's general reliance on explicit legislative statements pro-
tecting employees who pursue a statutory right or duty, when the 
legislative intent is subverted by exercising the at-will aspect of the 
employment relationship, some courts will imply a cause of action 
for wrongful discharge. 
This rationale has been primarily used in the workers' compen-
sation context, first articulated and adopted in Indiana in 
Frampton u. Central Indiana Gas CO.IH The Indiana Supreme 
Court held that a termination prompted by an employee's filing of 
a workers' compensation claim represented "an intentional wrong-
ful act on the part of the employer for which the injured employee 
is entitled to be fully compensated in damages."1i2 In so holding, 
the court likened the retaliatory discharge of employees to the re-
taliatory evictions of tenants, stating that an eviction caused by 
the tenant's reporting of housing code violations undermines statu-
tory policy objectives. Under such circumstances, contract rights 
are subordinated to public policy considerations. 
50. [d. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470. 
51. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). 
52. [d. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 428. 
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The law established in Indiana invaded other jurisdictions, with 
Michigan adopting the exception in Sventko v. Kroger CO.1i3 The 
Michigan Court of Appeals held that an employee's termination 
predicated on the filing of a workers' compensation claim is fully 
actionable. Ii. In reaching this decision, the court recognized that 
the Michigan common law rule applied, except where it could be 
shown that the employer's intention was to circumvent or defeat 
the public policy of the state.1i1i Forcefully advanced, the court's 
decision precluded an employer from frustrating legislative policies 
which infiltrated the domain of public welfare by using the ulti-
mate weapon of retaliation, involuntary termination. 
Eight years later, the Court of Appeals extended Sventko, hold-
ing that a workers' compensation claim filed against a previous 
employer and not disclosed to the present employer did not defeat 
the allegation of unlawful or retaliatory discharge. liS Indeed, the 
policy against hampering the filing of workers' compensation 
claims was so compelling that the court explicitly refused to for-
mulate any limitations on the exception. "Discouraging the fulfill-
ment of the legislative policy [to provide financial and medical 
benefits to the victims of work-connected injuries in an efficient, 
dignified, and certain form] by use of the most powerful weapon at 
the disposal of the employer, termination of employment, is obvi-
ously against the public policy of our State."1i7 
The Sventko rationale was further extended in Hrab v. Hayes -
Albion Corp., 1i8 when the appellate court found that an employee 
presented a valid claim for wrongful discharge if prompted by an 
intention to forestall the filing of a workers' compensation claim. 
Cases which fall outside the realm of workers' compensation 
claims have been given a mixed review. That courts are typically 
reluctant to digress from established terrain is most notably exem-
plified by Price v. Carmack Datsun.IiB The Illinois Supreme Court 
53. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976). 
54. [d. at 647, 245 N.W.2d at 153. 
55. [d. 
56. Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1984). The Illinois 
Supreme Court likewise expanded the doctrine of retaliatory discharges by an identical 
holding in Darnell v. Import Industries, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 158, 160, 473 N.E.2d 935, 938 
(1985). 
57. 131 Mich. App. at 191, 347 N.W.2d at 188. 
58. 103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981). 
59. 124 Ill. App. 3d 979, 464 N.E.2d 1245 (1984). 
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held that an employee who intended to file for health care benefits, 
and was terminated, did not have an actionable tort for wrongful 
discharge.6o Unlike Novosel, the conduct complained of did not 
"strike at the hearts of a citizen's societal rights, duties, and re-
sponsibilities,"61 thus failing to entangle public policy 
considerations. 
On a fundamental level, the decision of the court to not tamper 
with the employer's prerogative to terminate was unavoidable. A 
right conferred by statute, seeking legal redress for work-related 
injuries, can be distinguished from a benefit redounding to the em-
ployee by virtue of the employment relationship. The filing of 
health insurance claims falls within the ambit of a benefit.62 A 
right affects society, a benefit represents a private and purely indi-
vidual concern. The court was not prepared to expand the parame-
ters of this narrow public policy exception. For a discharge to be 
considered arbitrary or abusive, it must contravene a statute or be 
repugnant to legislated public policy. 
Other cases involving statutory rights include discharges of an 
employee for serving on a jury or filing legal action against the em-
ployer. While the majority of courts recognizing a public policy ex-
ception do not support an employee's discharge for fulfilling a civic 
duty, the courts have not been so uniformly inclined when em-
ployee lawsuits have been involved.6s 
Apart from the workers' compensation claim area, the treatment 
given to the vested or statutory right line of cases by the courts is 
not homogeneous. Ostensibly, the law remains in a state of flux. 
60. [d. at 982, 464 N.E.2d at 1247. 
61. 721 F.2d at 900. 
62. Only one court has recognized a wrongful discharge claim when the discharge was 
instituted to prevent the plaintiff from securing pension benefits. Savodnik v. Korvettes, 
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
63. A number of courts have addressed the issue of whether a cause of action for wrong-
ful discharge is sustained when an employee sues his employer. See Becket v. Welton 
Becket & Assoc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1974)(employee discharged for 
refusing to desist from pursuing a shareholders' derivative action). De Marco v. Publix 
Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1978), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980)(employee 
discharged for failing to drop the daughter's negligence action against the employer); Kava-
naugh v. KIM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242 (N.D: Ill. 1983) (employee properly 
discharged over a wage dispute which escalated into a threat of litigation). 
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3. Refusal to Commit an Illegal Act 
Conceptually, there is little difficulty in treating this type of re-
taliatory discharge as a public policy exception. When an employee 
is faced with making a choice between violating the law or risking 
termination, the interplay of public policy considerations is evi-
dent. As early as 1959, the California Court of Appeals unani-
mously held that a union's discharge of its business agent for re-
fusal to provide false testimony before a legislative committee was 
repugnant to the spirit of the law, thus contrary to public policy 
mandates.64 The court refused to have a hand in conduct which 
impaired the administration of justice. 
However, as previously noted, courts have often declined to sus-
tain a cause of action absent legislative guidance, especially when 
the motives of the employer are not necessarily in bad faith. This 
judicial hesistance to infringe upon the legislative domain was ap-
parent in O'Neill v. ARA Service Inc. 611 There an employee who 
was discharged for accusing company executives of defrauding the 
company was denied a claim for wrongful discharge, absent a 
showing of specific intent to do harm to the employee or to inter-
fere with the fulfillment of a public policy objective.66 Judicial ac-
tivism would not be used to create new causes of action. Rather, 
this function would be relegated to the legislative arm of the 
government. 
The above analysis indicates that the most difficult task of the 
courts is to determine what constitutes public policy. When deal-
ing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or OSHA stat-
utes, courts are able to act expeditiously and decisively as the pub-
lic policy considerations, shaped by legislative history, are clear-
cut. And the courts may intercede, as Novosel exemplifies, when 
64. The landmark case which first established a public policy exception to the at-will 
doctrine is Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,344 P.2d 25 
(1959). In reversing the trial court's decision, the appellate court held that an employer may 
not discharge an employee who refused to perjure himself before a legislative investigatory 
committee. The court noted that to hold otherwise would condone illegal acts: 
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy 
and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether the 
employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the 
employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute. 
[d. at 187, 344 P.2d at 27. 
65. 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
66. [d. 
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public policy implications interface with constitutionally guaran-
teed liberties.67 
Courts are palpably reluctant to declare a discharge as against 
public policy when the legislature has not made a definitive public 
policy declaration. Reporting the questionable accounting practices 
of an employer,S8 or the criminal activities of fellow employee to an 
employer,69 will generally not suffice. Neither will allegations un-
supported by extensive factual documentation.70 Nebulous philo-
sophical or equitable arguments will not survive. Courts generally 
refuse to extrapolate from other sources of the authority which 
should emanate from the legislature. As of this writing, the major-
ity of jurisdictions so hold. 
B. The Implied Contract Exception 
Although less recognized than the public policy exception, an-
other substantive legal theory on which courts rely to protect em-
ployees from unjust dismissals is the implied contract exception.71 
The exception is principally derived through the interpretation of 
employee handbooks, personnel manuals and oral representations 
made by the employer regarding an employee's longevity of ser-
67. Relying on the federal Constitution and state constitution as the sources of public 
policy, and not a state statute, the court deftly applied state action proscriptions of govern-
mental employees to private employers. Finding that "the right of political expression of a 
corporation enjoys a transcendent constitutional position regardless of other societal or con-
stitutional interests," the court expanded public policy dictates to preclude discharge by 
private entities. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). However, a 
perceptible and predictable retrenchment from Novosel occurred in Staats v. Ohio Nat'l. 
Life Ins. Co., 118 L.R.R.M. 3242 (W.O. Pa. 1985). The plaintiff, a male, was discharged when 
a woman other than his spouse accompanied him to the company's national convention. 
Citing Novosel as germane authority, plaintiff alleged that his discharge violated public pol-
icy because it abridged his right of expression and free association. The court conceded that 
while the freedom of association is an important social right, it is not a significant and 
recognized violation of public policy considerations. 
68. Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982). 
69. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). 
70. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). The Maryland 
Court of Appeals held that "'bold allegations' (falsification of corporate documents and 
other illegal practices) which were not factually documented would not provide adequate 
grounds upon which to have a decision of undeclared public policy of this state." (emphasis 
added.) 
71. The following states recognize the implied contract theory: California, Connecticut, 
Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma and Washington. 
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vice. Whether a promise regarding job security can be inferred 
from these circumstances is pivotal in determining the formation 
of a contract. The parties' intentions, indispensable to effectuating 
the terms of their understanding, is controlling on the issue of 
whether an inference of continued employment is proper.72 
The implied contract exception was shaped initially in a Michi-
gan case, Toussaint v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield.7s Holding that a 
supervisory employee had reasonable and legitimate expectations 
that discharge would occur only for cause,7. the Michigan Supreme 
Court observed: 
The question whether the terminations of the plaintiffs' employment was 
in breach of the contract, i.e. whether the terminations were for cause 
and in compliance with the defendants' procedures, was also one for the 
jury. A declaration that the employee was discharged for unsatisfactory 
work is subject to judicial review: the jury may decide whether the em-
ployee was, in fact, discharged for unsatisfactory work. The promise to 
terminate employment for cause only would be illusory if the employer 
would be permitted to be the sole judge and final arbiter of the propriety 
of the discharge. There must be some review of the employer's decision if 
the "cause" contract is to be distinguished from the "satisfaction" 
contract.7D 
The scope of the implied contract exception, firmly established 
in Toussaint, was broadened considerably in Novosel v. Nation-
wide -Insurance CO.7S Adopting a doctrine historically applied to 
collective bargaining agreements," the appellate court held that a 
contractual just cause requirement could be fashioned from an em-
ployer's custom or practice. Although the constitutional considera-
72. If the parties in an employment relationship expressly agree to not impose any limi-
tations on the right to terminate, the at-will doctrine would be applicable. 
73. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). 
74. Toussaint established that when oral promises or written representations of job se-
curity are made, the burden of proof then shifts to the employer to prove that the discharge 
was motivated by sufficient and well-documented cause. 
75. 408 Mich. 483, 292 N.W.2d 883 (1980). 
76. 721 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1983). See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
77. The doctrine of past practice is significant in labor-management relations, particu-
larly as it affects the arbitration process. Defined as an overlay to the express terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement, a superstructure of understanding which gives meaning and 
practical significance to the expressions in the contract, these practices and customs become 
embodied in the agreement, and are thus as enforceable as the written provisions. Most 
arbitrators who have rendered decisions on past practice contend that to be binding, it must 
be unequivocal, enunciated and pursued as a course of action, and firmly established for a 
fixed period of time 
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tions discussed in section A played a significant role in the court's 
decision, the additional rationale combined with the constitutional 
issues to further obscure the court's formulation of public policy. 
Thus, Novosel appears to extend the parameters of the implied 
contract theory beyond those of many jurisdictions by permitting 
recovery if a custom or practice prevails, as opposed to mere reli-
ance on implied statements in handbooks, or oral representations. 
Despite Novosel and subsequent cases,78 courts have made it 
clear that they do not wish to create a uniform just cause require-
ment for all discharges. Instead, the courts may be seizing on ex-
isting causes of action to branch out into other areas. In the last 
several years, Michigan courts and others have developed a new 
cause of action as a logical outgrowth of the implied contract case, 
holding that an employee may maintain a tort action against his 
employer for negligent breach of an implied contract. A recent 
Michigan case illustrates this development. 
In Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc.,79 the federal district court ex-
panded the remedial scope of an implied contract breach by hold-
ing that an employer who did not establish a breach through his 
actions may nevertheless be liable in tort for the negligent per-
formance of the contract. Thus, the employer is held to a duty of 
fair dealing in the evaluation of an employee, and the breach of 
that duty can expose him to substantial monetary damages.8o 
In looking at the underlying reasoning of the decision, a desire to 
alleviate an otherwise harsh result seems to have been the ration-
ale behind the court's thinking, rather than an attempt to alter the 
employer-employee relationship. This is particularly apparent 
when considered in light of Valentine v. General American Credit, 
Inc.,81 a case which caused a slight retrenchment in the deviation 
of the at-will doctrine. Although an express employment contract 
was involved, the plaintiff claimed a right to exemplary damages 
78. See Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 116 L.R.R.M. 3110 (Pa. 1984) (an employee man-
ual which becomes part of the parties' employment contract does not give an at-will em-
ployee a definite length of employment.) Compare with Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave. Inc., 728 
F.2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1984) (while employee handbooks can create just cause requirements, 
Pennsylvania courts did not intend to create a "uniform just cause requirement for all dis-
charges.") (Emphasis added.) Id. at 225. 
79. 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982). 
80. Id. 
81. 420 Mich. 256, 332 N.W.2d 591 (1984). 
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based on mental distress.82 The court, relying on the general rule 
denying recovery for mental distress damages, held that "absent 
allegations and proof of tortious conduct existing independent of 
the breach,"83 exemplary damages may not be awarded in common 
law actions brought for breach of a commercial contract. 
The implied agreement cases as a group are difficult for the 
courts to review. Courts must look at general principles of contract 
law, and objectively determine the parties' intentions, enforcing 
job security assurances where it can be ascertained from the sur-
rounding circumstances that the parties did not desire an at-will 
employment relationship. The extent to which the courts elect to 
pierce the protective shield of the employer-employee relationship 
depends, by and large, on the equities - length of employment, 
nature and practice of the industry and the background and em-
ployment track of the employee. It would seem that while courts 
may be loath to dictate that an employment relationship continue 
where it is the intention of the employer to sever it, courts also feel 
compelled to protect traditional contract principles, ensuring that 
where essential in preventing harm or abusive displacement, they 
will strike down the at-will doctrine. 
C. The Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception 
Recently, several courts have recognized an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts, even though 
the employment relationship is at-will.84 This covenant assumes 
that neither party will do anything which will injure the rights of 
the other to receive the benefits of the contract. 
Confusion emanates as to whether violations of the covenant 
sound in tort or contract. Employer actions which mislead an em-
ployee, and constitute fraud, have been held to violate the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.811 Since such actions sound 
82. Id. at 258, 332 N.W.2d at 592. 
83. Id. at 263, 332 N.W.2d at 593. 
84. This exception is recognized in only three states - California, Massachusetts and 
Montana. 
85. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). 
The court suggested that longevity of service coupled with the internal procedures for adju-
dicating employee disputes, creating a form of promissory estoppel which required just 
cause to sustain a termination. "The covenant of good faith and fair dealing by the em-
ployer . . . insure that neither contracting party will do anything which would injure the 
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in tort, punitive damages are awardable for the most egregious of 
cases, broadening the scope of remedies typically available to at-
will employees. 
The most recent and expansive treatment of the covenant was 
achieved in Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital where the 
Montana court extended its application to probationary employ-
ees.88 The groundwork for this case was laid in Gates v. Life of 
Montana Insurance CO.,87 where the court held that this conve-
nant exists independent of the terms of the agreement of the par-
ties. Any violation of this covenant is a tort which qualifies for pu-
nitive damages. 
While three jurisdictions recognize the viability of the good faith 
and fair dealing doctrine, Michigan does not. Nor does it appear to 
be on the verge of extending formal recognition. The Michigan 
Court of Appeals, operating in a judicial vacuum spawned by Prus-
sing v. General Motors Corp.,88 is visibly reluctant to enter the 
changing frontier of the law. In Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar CO.,89 
the panel refused to sustain plaintiff's action grounded in contract, 
for ... if it [the doctrine of implied good faith and fair dealing] is 
to be judicially mandated that change should come from the Su-
preme Court."90 
Courts have generally treated this nebulous employment-at-will 
exception quixotically; they do not view it to be within their au-
thority to penalize employers who act in good faith. Only where it 
can be shown that an employer has acted vindictively or mali-
ciously are the courts likely to intercede and imply an enforceable 
duty to deal in good faith. 
The most perplexing aspect in this area of wrongful discharge 
law is the courts' inconsistent and erratic treatment of the facts. 
An implied covenant of fair dealing and good faith, which purports 
to exist independent of any other contractual obligation of the par-
ties, and a breach of the covenant, should sound in contract. Yet 
several courts, taking the lead from Montana, have characterized 
rights of the other to receive the benefits of the contract. It is unconditional and indepen-
dent." [d. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728. 
86. __ Mont. __ , 693 P.2d 487 (1984). 
87. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d lO63 (1982). 
88. 403 Mich. 366, 269 N.W.2d 181 (1978). 
89. 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981). 
90. [d. at 473, 308 N.W.2d at 463. 
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the covenant as a duty, permitting them to conclude that a breach 
represents tortious conduct. This may well be the legal stepping-
stone for allowing punitive damages. The theoretical confusion be-
comes even more obfuscating when the courts, not knowing 
whether to label the doctrine a duty or a covenant, conclude that 
its violation is both a breach of contract and tort, qualifying for 
compensatory as well as punitive damages. 
It is understandable that the majority of courts consider this 
area to be a radical departure from the common law, and avoid it 
entirely. Clear legal analysis of the issues is hampered by the vacil-
lation of the courts who have elected to intercede to protect em-
ployee rights. For the majority of courts, however, this type of 
modification of the at-will doctrine remains the prerogative of the 
state legislature, not the judiciary. 
D. Other Considerations Triggering an Exception 
Some of the more enterprising jurisdictions have entertained 
new ideas regarding the restrictions applicable to the at-will doc-
trine. These formulations, divergent at best, proceed along two 
lines: where independent consideration is provided by the em-
ployee in addition to performance of services in exchange for 
wages,91 and where a corporation, which yields substantial eco-
nomic power over employees, compels them to engage in conduct 
jeopardizing the public interest.92 
The few jurisdictions9S which have carved out exceptions to the 
91. See Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 21 S.E.2d 193 (1942) (termination of a plaintiff who 
had relinquished all interest in his established business to accept employment with the de-
fendant constituted a breach of contract.) Compare Weber with Orsini v. Trojan Steel Co., 
219 S.C. 272, S.E.2d 878 (1951) (moving one's family and quitting a job was not sufficient 
independent consideration to warrant sustaining a breach of contract claim.) 
92. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) The 
court permitted a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge of an employee who had 
provided information to the authorities regarding the criminal conduct of a fellow employee. 
The supreme court noted that "[t)here is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty than the enforcement of a state's criminal code .... There 
is no public policy more important or more fundamental than one favoring the effective 
protection of the laws and property of citizens." Id. at 129, 421 N.E.2d at 879. 
93. Florida: Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1960)(employee provided addi-
tional consideration for this employment in exchange for a guarantee of lifetime employ-
ment); Illinois: Milton v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 101 ill. App. 3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829 
(l981)(court sustained an employee's emotional distress claim against an employer who had 
required the employee to falsify work reports used in billing customers); Minnesota: Com-
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at-will rule on the basis of "other considerations" seem to focus 
their attention on the extent of the detriment to the employee (an 
extension of the promissory estoppel doctrine in contract law), un-
equal bargaining power between employer and employee, and occa-
sionally, the employee's longevity of service. This area is otherwise 
too novel and not widely recognized; any other comments or con-
clusions would be premature.94 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE NEED FOR STATUTORY 
GUIDELINES 
The inchoate body of law created by judicial interpretation has 
refueled the debate regarding the type of remedial measures most 
likely to provide meaningful protection to discharged unorganized 
workers. Even though courts are not permitted to legislate, some 
have engaged in judicial activism. The case law analysis in section 
II reveals the flaws of those courts who have been persuaded by 
equitable considerations to penetrate the otherwise impregnable 
wall of the employment-at-will doctrine. 
To fill the gaps left by judicial vicissitudes, inadequate unioniza-
tion, and corrective but insubstantial voluntary employer action,911 
pare Albers v. Wilson Co., 184 F. Supp. 812 (Minn. 1960)(it was determined that the subject 
contract was not supported by extra consideration) with Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, 
Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972) (opposite result was achieved based upon an 
exchange of property valued at $350,000.00); North Dakota: Sjaastad v. Great N. Ry. Co., 
155 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. 1957) (the court held that a railroad employee subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement is not an at-will employee). 
94. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a limitation on the subject of unjust dis-
missals is federal pre-emption. Sources of pre-emption include: 1) § 301 of the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act; 2) the National Labor Relations Act; and 3) the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA). For a more detailed discussion on this subject, see C. 
BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS - FORMATION, OPERATION, 
AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH (1984) and Suilichem & Lewis, Recent Developments in Michi-
gan Wrongful Discharge Law, 64 MICH. B.J. 1086 (1985). 
95. Professor Stieber has ably discussed the ramifications of these unpalatable alterna-
tive courses of action. See Steiber supra note 11. As to the process of unionization, Profes-
sor Stieber observes that if not expressly exempt from the National Labor Relations Act, 
military, supervisory and railroad employees, then the likelihood of organizing for the pur-
pose of engaging in collective bargaining is not substantial. Characterizing the union move-
ment response as "an oversimplification and an illusory solution," he notes that many work-
ers who join unions do not receive the benefits of unionization because they represent a 
minority of the bargaining unit in which they are employed. Resort to voluntary programs 
developed by responsive employers, while available, rarely occurs. And finally, reliance on 
the judiciary to provide the solution is, as the case law discussion suggests, ill-placed. Even 
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some states have endeavored to devise statutory guidelines, provid-
ing a more concrete and uniform approach in extending job secur-
ity protection. These statutes were to supplement the legislation 
abrogating the mutuality doctrine in certain instances - civil 
rights acts, OSHA statutes, fair employment practices, 
whistle blower protective legislation and public employment acts. 
This section of the Article highlights the response of several legis-
latures98 in their efforts to pass just cause legislation. 
Michigan 
Largely intended to build on the law of Toussaint,97 on June 17, 
1982, House Bill 5892 was introduced and referred to the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary. The bill prohibited the unfair discharge of 
certain groups of employees and established procedures for resolv-
ing disputes .. 
The Michigan bill prohibited discharges except for just cause, 
but it did not provide a statutory definition of the threshold re-
quirement. Seemingly, its parameters were to be developed by the 
arbitration process, borrowing the criteria and standards employed 
in the unionized sector. A "two-tiered structure" for claim resolu-
tion was established in Section 5 of the bill. The aggrieved em-
ployee, upon the filing of a complaint, would have the matter sub-
mitted to mediation. The mediation process would continue for a 
period of thirty days. If mediation did not yield a settlement, arbi-
tration could be invoked. 
Comprehensive in scope, the Michigan bill formulated elaborate 
procedures for the selection and payment of arbitrators, prescribed 
though the courts have interceded where employer conduct has bordered the egregious or 
vindictive, they remain "laizzez faire." [d. at 24-25. 
96. Just-cause legislation was also considered, but not enacted, in the following states: 
Colorado (Colorado H.R. 1485 (1981)); Connecticut (Gen. Assembly 38 (1973), 5179 (1974) 
and 5151 (1975)); New Jersey (Gen. Assembly 1832 (1980». 
97. Although the bill did not provide a definition of just cause, it did contain a proce-
dure for notification to a discharged employee. Within fifteen days after the discharge, the 
employee was to receive a written notice identifying all reasons prompting the termination, 
and informing him of his right to request arbitration if he wished to grieve the action. The 
author contends that the reason a just cause definition was omitted is because Michigan, a 
heavily organized state, has a solid body of law created by arbitrators over the last 30-40 
years. Standards defining just cause are firmly enshrined in the law of arbitral jurispru-
dence. For a more extensive assessment of the Michigan bill, see Mennemeier, Protection 
From Unjust Discharges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (1982). 
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rules for oral hearings, identified limitations on arbitral authority, 
and established a broad review and enforcement mechanism, paral-
leling, except for one exception, the Michigan General Court Rules 
on general contractual arbitration.98 Despite all the merits, the 
proposed legislation on unjust discharge was defeated in December 
of 1982, upon conclusion of the legislative term. The bill was never 
reported out of committee. 
Apart from general resistance by vested interests opposed to al-
tering the status quo, there was specific resistance voiced during 
the bill's pendency. Employers were reluctant to support a bill 
which would erode managerial authority and personnel decision-
making. Unions, on the other hand, were opposed to the legislation 
because they felt it provided the type of protection which only the 
collective bargaining process could achieve. As one commentator 
recently noted on this subject: "[L]ittle support for such a proposal 
can be expected from unions, as it would not be in their self-inter-
est to advocate legislation which would eradicate part of the incen-
tive for workers to join and form unions."99 
Pennsylvania 
The Pennsylvania House bill, introduced and referred to the 
Committee on Labor Relations in July of 1981/00 closely paralleled 
the Michigan legislation,IOI with mediation constituting the first 
step in the remedies process. Failure to resolve the dispute during 
the thirty days after the commencement of mediation entitled the 
employer and the terminated employee to proceed to arbitration, 
which is final and binding. 
The proposed measure was comprehensive in coverage. The leg-
islation described the effect of a final and binding arbitration pro-
cedure, and then proceeded to address the limited right of judicial 
review, citing all bases upon which courts could disturb an arbitra-
98. Id. Section 13 of the bill authorized a court of appropriate jurisdiction to review the 
arbitrator's award if it was not "supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence 
on the whole record." This expansive standard is used by the courts to review administra-
tive decisions. Id. 
99. See Steiber, supra note 11, at 25. 
100. H.R. Res. 1742. 
101. The Pennsylvania bill did not provide a just-cause definition. The amendatory lan-
guage only indicated that an employer could not discharge an employee except for just 
cause. 
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tor's award.102 Absent such circumstances, arbitrators' remedies 
would be sustained.103 The politics associated with statutory re-
form interceded; the Pennsylvania bill was defeated at the end of 
the legislative term. 
California 
The California bill of 1984, similar more in substance to that of 
Michigan,104 closely adhered to the recommendations of the Spe-
cial Committee of the State Bar of California. Over vociferous em-
ployer dissent, the legislation was introduced. The bill, unlike 
Michigan's and Pennsylvania's, established a fund for employer 
and employee contributions to defray the costs of administering 
the act, and permitted the prevailing party to collect attorney fees 
and costs associated with the "med/arb" system if the wrongful 
discharge was based on harassment. 
The California legislature's attempt to infuse some accountabil-
ity and balance in the historic relationship between employer and 
employee was unsuccessful. The original bill underwent major revi-
sions during the deliberation stage. Some of the advocates of the 
legislation withdrew their support, contending that the amend-
ments were "antithetical to the recommendations (of the State Bar 
of California) and made a mockery of any attempt to arrive at a 
balanced approach which would take into account the interests of 
both employer and employee."1011 
Two bills were reintroduced in the legislature in 1985 in re-
sponse to the defeat of the 1984 package, with neither surviving 
the end of the session.106 Failure to enact such legislation leaves 
California with the common law. 
Despite the need for more predictability in resolving wrongful 
102. Most general arbitration statutes provide for a limited right of judicial review. Sec-
tion 9 of the Pennsylvania bill dealing with judicial review was restrictive in scope; enforce-
ment or deference to an arbitrator's award would be achieved except where an arbitrator 
was without or exceeded his jurisdiction, or where the award was procured by fraud, collu-
sion or other unlawful means. 
103. Permissible remedies included: a) sustaining the discharge; b) reinstating the em-
ployee with no partial or full back pay; or c) a severance payment. 
104. Assembly Res. 3017 (1984). 
105. Letter from Professor Gould to Members of the Labor and Employment Commit-
tee, May 2, 1984. 
106. Assembly Res. 1400 (1984); S. Res. 1348 (1984). 
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discharge actions, the above overview of legislative endeavors sug-
gests that statutory protection remains, for the moment, elusive. If 
legislation is to be enacted, the interaction and political leanings of 
specific groups will be instrumental. These groups comprised of 
employees, employers, trade union and the organized bar, are 
clearly influenced by a number of different factors: 
Employees in the non unionized private sector are in a precarious 
and vulnerable position, subject to the arbitrary actions of man-
agement. These employees would benefit from the passage of just 
cause legislation providing a more secure work status. 
Employers have historically been opposed to measures which 
would restrict their absolute right to terminate. Despite the large 
jury verdicts in isolated instances where employer conduct was 
considered oppressive, the majority of jurisdictions extend em-
ployee protection only under limited bases. The public policy ex-
ception discussed earlier, an outgrowth of tort theory, is recognized 
as a viable defense in only 20 jurisdictions.107 Employers must ei-
ther risk jury verdict excesses or begin to support legislation which 
contains a mediation or arbitration compenent. 
Trade unions generally present dichotomous views. On the one 
hand, they do not wish to support legislation which protects em-
ployees from wrongful discharge, the very protection they have, 
through the negotiation and collective bargaining process, provided 
to their membership. Their ability to organize is proportionately 
related to their ability to protect employees from arbitrary dismis-
sal. On the other hand, they are often regarded as the "theoretical 
spokesmen for workers," thus favoring legislation which extends 
new rights to employees. 
The legal profession has ambivalent reactions toward wrongful 
discharged legislation. The plaintiffs' bar advocates no limitations 
on an employee's right to seek legal recourse while the defense bar 
does not wish to increase the legal exposure of defendants by legis-
lation which creates new causes of action. However, if courts con-
tinue to grope for ways to extend protection to unorganized em-
ployees, attorneys as a group would probably support legislation as 
long as it contained an alternative form of dispute resolution -
mediation, arbitration or a combination of the two processes. 
A shift in movement by any of these interest groups could dra-
107. See supra note 38. 
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matically alter the prospects for the enactment of legislation. Like-
lihood of passage may also be enhanced if the legislature does not 
attempt to statutorily define just cause, relying instead on the 
unique body of industrial jurisprudence to supply the standard 
and application. 
Despite the failures of states to modify the employment-at-will 
rule by legislation, the demand and need for protective legislation 
remains. Courts may not be able to provide the type of judicial 
review such wrongful discharge cases often require. Substantively, 
courts lack the expertise and legal redress does not always ade-
quately deal with the concerns inherent in the common law of the 
shop. 
These deficiencies suggest the inevitability of legislation to re-
duce the philosophical cleavage left by the decisional law. The next 
section of the Article will address the means of extending substan-
tive and procedural protections to at-will employees through a 
state mandated arbitration scheme. 
IV. AN ARBITRATION MODEL FOR THE AT-WILL DISCHARGE 
A. The Arbitration Process 
Legal writers who have addressed the doctrine of employment-
at-will within the context of legislative reform have proposed sev-
eral alternative proceduresl08 in lieu of litigation to resolve wrong-
ful discharge disputes. Although all of these procedures are protec-
tive of employee rights, the procedure evoking the most acclaim is 
arbitration. 109 
108. See Cox, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1245 
(1963); Mennemeier, Protection From Unjust Discharges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19 HARv. 
J. ON LEGIS. 49 (1982). See also supra note 11. 
109. Two of the alternatives proposed are fact-finding and mediation. Fact-finding is an 
investigative process involving a neutral or impartial third-party who determines and stud-
ies the facts and relative positions of each party in an impasse, and focuses on major issues. 
Sometimes the fact-finder is only required to report his/her determinations of facts and 
hope the facts are so clear as to provide the parties with an answer to their dispute. Fre-
quently, the impartial third-party is empowered to make recommendations on the basis of 
the facts presented. However, these recommendations are not binding on the parties. They 
are designed to serve as the basis for further negotiations and subsequent agreement. Medi-
ation, on the other hand, is a process that provides for the intervention of an acceptable 
neutral or impartial third party who assists and persuades the contesting parties in reaching 
a mutually acceptable settlement of their differences through appropriate means of reconcil-
iation, interpretation, clarification, suggestion and advice. This process is purely voluntary. 
HeinOnline -- 1986 Det. C.L. Rev. 30 1986
30 Detroit College of Law Review [1:1 
Arbitration for years, the mechanism for resolving collective bar-
gaining impasses and rights grievances, has long been accepted as 
an effective non-combative method of dispute resolution. Pundits 
of history have traced its roots to the ancient Babylonian empire 
under Hammurabi. When Hammurabi revised the legal codes in 
Babylonia, his new system was partially superceded by a civil pro-
cedure which, in form and substance, conformed to arbitration. no 
Under the code, the plaintiff would apply directly to a functionary 
called the mashkin for dispute resolution.1ll The functionary's role 
was to settle the case without invoking the legal process. ll2 A judge 
was not permitted to disturb the "arbitrator's" sentence once it 
was recorded in writing.1l3 If the dispute was not settled through 
this process, the matter was then submitted to the regular civil 
courts presided over by "professional judges."lU This code ulti-
mately influenced the civilization of near Eastern countries, mold-
ing the contours of their legal systems. 
The early Anglo-Norman period contains glimmerings of the use 
of arbitration. Although the historical literature does not make the 
distinction between jury determinations and arbitration proceed-
ings, both systems involved a submission whereby the parties 
might "put themselves upon (ponunt se super) a jury or upon one 
or more men as arbitrators of a dispute. lUI 
The idea that arbitration, not the courts, could be used to settle 
civil disputes gained further recognition in the Kentish laws of 
Aethelberht (circa 602-603) which mentioned the use of a volun-
tary impartial tribunal. ll6 
A less skeletal perspective on the arbitration process was re-
vealed in the laws of Hlothere and Eadric (circa 673-685) where 
this description of an arbitration proceeding is found: 
At any time in the process, either party can reject further participation by the mediator, 
who has no formal tenure and is completely subject to the desires of of the parties. The 
mediator has no power to make decisions or to force the parties to accept any suggestions or 
recommendations which the mediator might make for the settlement of the dispute. 
110. CL. WOOLLEY, THE SUMERIANS 93 (1961). 
111. [d. 
112. [d. at 94. 
113. [d. 
114. [d. 
115. See Murray, Arbitration in the Anglo-Saxon and Early Norman Periods, 16 ARB. J. 
193 (1962). 
116. [d. at 195. 
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If one man charges another, after the other has provided him with a 
surety, then three days later they shall attempt to find an arbitrator, un-
less the accuser prefers a longer delay. Within a week after the suit has 
been decided by arbitration, the accused shall render justice to the other 
and satisfy him with money, or with an oath, whichever he [the accused] 
prefers. If, however, he is not willing to do this, then he shall pay 100 
shillings, without [giving] an oath, on the day after arbitration.ll7 
31 
The early exponents of arbitration subscribed to the view that a 
private tribunal functioning outside the aegis of the formal judicial 
system was more responsive to the needs of the populace,118 a view 
circumscribed in "The Anglo-Saxon Courts of Law, Essays in An-
glo-Saxon Law." In the words of the authors: 
In a society which has no confidence either in its judges, its judicial pro-
cess, or its very law itself, - which could devise no system of reform in 
the practice, nor of equitable protection against the evils, of that law, -
it was certainly not surprising that men should seek a remedy outside 
the public tribunals . .. 118 (emphasis added.) 
This populist assessment of the role of arbitration was embraced 
by the English in the period succeeding the Norman Conquest. 
However, the widespread use of arbitration under the developing 
English common law was undermined by traces of judicial animos-
ity. Many courts, maintained that arbitration would oust them of 
their jurisdiction, refused to enforce executory agreements to arbi-
trate, concluding that they were repugnate to public policy. 
The elimination of the ecclesiastical courts and concomitant bur-
geoning court dockets, however, perpetuated a greater reliance on 
arbitration. Jurisdictional rivalries all but disappeared in the pe-
riod following the Norman Conquest. Adopted by the Royal Courts 
as an adjunct to court proceedings, arbitration was finally recog-
nized as another form of dispute resolution, intended to supple-
ment, not supplant, the judicial process. 
Although George Washington established an arbitration provi-
sion in his will,120 arbitration in the United States remained fairly 
dormant during the years following the American Revolution. The 
Bill of Rights, the guarantor of rights deemed sacrosanct to a na-
tion which had newly acquired its independence, was seemingly 
117. [d. 
118. [d. at 204. 
119. [d. at 205. 
120. F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKoURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (4th ed. 1985). 
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antithetical to arbitration - the right to a jury trial was too im-
portant to the overall concept of justice to be. frivolously 
relinquished. 
But as the nation progressed, and the jurisdictional parameters 
of the courts became better defined, state legislatures began to en-
courage the use of other methods of dispute resolution. With the 
passage of the first modern arbitration act in New York in 1920,121 
the remaining vestiges of judicial hositility and fear dissolved. Un-
like the common law process where courts were reluctant to en-
force arbitration agreements, modern arbitration acts permitted ju-
dicial enforcement of all agreements, with no distinction made 
between future disputes and existing disputes. Such enforcement 
was an important development in the evolution of the process. 
This historical overview was given by one court: 
Arbitration has had a long and troubled history. The early common law 
courts did not favor arbitration, and greatly limited the powers of arbi-
trators. But in recent times, a great change in attitude and policy has 
taken place .... [A]rbitration has become an acceptable and favored 
method of resolving disputes, praised by the courts as an expeditious and 
economical method of relieving overburdened civil calendars. (citations 
omitted.)UI 
Today, fourty-three states have modern arbitration statutes,123 
121. M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 28 (1985). 
122. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 706, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
882 (1976) (quoting Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 183-84, 260 P.2d 
156, 172 (1953)). 
123. These states have enacted modern arbitration acta: Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 
09.43.010 (1983); Ari2ona: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (1981); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. 
§ 34-511 (1985 Supp.); California: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280 (West 1982); Colorado: COLO. 
REv. STAT. § 13-22-201 (1985 Supp.); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-408 (West 
1966); Delaware: Del. Code Ann. TIT. 10 § 5701 (1975); FLORIDA: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 682.01 
(WEST SUPP. 1985); HAWAII: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 658-1 (1976); IDAHO: Idaho Code § 7-901 
(1979); ILLINOIS: Ill. Ann. Stat. CH. 10, § 101 (1975); INDIANA: Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-2-1 
(WEST 1983); IOWA: Iowa Code § 679Al (1950); KANSAS: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401 (1982); 
KENTUCKY: 1984 Ky. ACTS 278; LOUISIANA: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:4201 (WEST .1983); MAINE: 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. TIT. 14, § 5927 (1980); MARYLAND: Md. Cta. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-
201 (1984); MASSACHUSETTS: Mass. Ann. Laws CH. 251, § 1 (MICHLE/LAW. CooP. 1980); MICHI-
GAN: Mich. Compo Laws § 600.5001 (1979); MINNESOTA: Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.08 (WEST 
SUPP. 1985); MISSOURI: Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.350 (VERNON SUPP. 1986); MONTANA: Mont. Code 
Ann. § 27-5-101 (1985); NEBRASKA: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2103 (1973); NEVADA: Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 38.015 (1985); NEW HAMPSHIRE: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542:1 (1974); NEW JERSEY: N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:24-1 (WEST 1952); NEW MEXICO: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 44-7-1 (1976); NEW YORK: 
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7501 (McKINNEY 1980); NORTH CAROLINA: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.1 
(1983); OHIO: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.01 (PAGE 1981); OKLAHOMA: Okla. Stat. Ann. TIT. 
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permitting courts to compel arbitration if a party is recalcitrant in 
participating in arbitration proceedings. In addition, these statutes 
require a court to defer to an arbitrator's award, and enforce the 
final decision if the parties do not self-effectuate it. 
Through these statutes, the legislative objective of fostering ar-
bitration is apparent. The judicial process was to be primarily, if 
not exclusively used to assist arbitration, ensuring that it remain 
an autonomous adjudicatory process. Only when procedural or sub-
stantive irregularities prevail, which jeopardize or prejudice the 
rights of a party, will the courts intercede. Otherwise, arbitration is 
regarded as a crucial and effective complement to, and equal part-
ner with, the judicial process. 
B. The Application of the Process to the At-Will Employee 
Dichotomous views have been presented by commentators on 
what type of employee should be covered in a statutory scheme. 
Most have argued that arbitration, which protects masses of blue 
collar workers, should include all white collar workers, specifically 
managerial employees. Several, however, have urged limitations on 
certain classes of white collar employees. 
This divergence of views was well-reflected in the just cause leg-
islation introduced in Michigan, Pennsylvania and California.124 
The Michigan legislation excluded confidential and managerial em-
ployees and those who did not work for an employer for not less 
than fifteen hours per week for six months.l2l5 Although the Cali-
fornia bill defined an employee more narrowly than the Michigan 
15 § 801 (WEST SUPP. 1985); OREGON: Or. Rev. Stat. § 33.210 (1981); PENNSYLVANIA: Pa. Stat. 
Ann. TIT. 42. § 7301 (PURDON 1981); RHODE ISLAND: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-1 (1970); SOUTH 
CAROLINA: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10 (LAW Co-oP. 1985); SOUTH DAKOTA: S.D. Codified Laws 
Ann. § 21-25A-l (1979); TENNESSEE: Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-302 (1980); TEXAS: Tex. Rev. 
Civ. Stat. Ann. ART. 2224 (VERNON 1973); UTAH: Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-1 (1977); VERMONT: 
Vt. Stat. Ann. TIT. 12. § 5651 (1985 SUPP.); VIRGINIA: Va. Code § 8.01-577 (1984); WASHING-
TON: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.04.010 (1961); WISCONSIN: Wis. Stat. Ann. § 788.01 (WEST 
1981); WYOMING: Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-101 (1977). THE FOLLOWING STATES DO NOT HAVE A MOD-
ERN ACT BUT HAVE SOME STATUTORY FORM OF COMMON LAW ARBITRATION; ALABAMA: Ala. Code § 
6-6-1 (1977); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: D.C. Code Ann. § 16-4301 (1985 SUPP.); GEORGIA: GA. 
Code Ann. § 9-9-1 (1985 SUPP.); MISSISSIPPI: Miss. Code Ann. § 11-15-1 (1972); NEBRASKA: 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2103 (1973); NORTH DAKOTA: N.D. Cent. Code § 32-20-01 (1976); WEST 
VIRGINIA: W. Va. Code § 55-10-1 (1984). THE ABOVE CITATIONS DO NOT INCLUDE PUERTO RICO. 
124. Mich. H. Res. 5892 (1982), Penn. H. Res. 1742 (1981) and Cal. Assembly Res. 3017 
(1984). 
125. Mich. H.B. No. 5892 § 3(1)(1982). 
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bill, neither California's nor Pennsylvania's legislation excluded 
employees on the basis of their employment classification.128 Those 
not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, an individual 
employment contract, or civil service tenure guidelines would qual-
ify for the mediation or arbitration system. 
Those who have argued against an expansive application of the 
arbitration process have done so forcefully and cogently, citing ra-
tionale which revives the theory undergirding the traditional at-
will doctrine. The conduct of management personnel can directly 
affect corporate profitability or demise. In as much as the relation-
ship between a manager and owner is most closely likened to a 
partnership, (or marriage) it is imperative from the employer's per-
spective, that managerial and confidential employees not be 
cloaked with protection. The business relationship is supported by 
trust, and to a lesser, but nevertheless significant extent, intellec-
tual compatibility. To require the relationship to continue when 
one party desires a separation would adversely affect the free en-
terprise system by impermissibly intruding upon managerial 
prerogatives. 
Most personnel handbooks contain exculpatory language, reaf-
firming that the probationary employee can be discharged without 
cause and generally without notice at any time prior to a transfor-
mation in status. The reason for excluding new employees is to al-
low the employer an opportunity to assess an employee's attitude 
and work performance level. It is basically a trial period for both 
parties involved in the employment relationship. 
Although the just cause legislation surveyed did not contain ex-
clusionary language for probationary employees, those who have 
recommended a statutory solution to the at-will problem have sug-
gested that probationary employees be excluded from the thrust of 
the legislation. Probationary employees are considered transients. 
As a point of comparison, collective bargaining agreements do not, 
in the main, extend grievance and arbitration protection to proba-
tionary employees. 
In Mennemeier's article on unjust discharge, several additional 
reasons are identified for refusing to extend dismissal protection to 
probationary employees: a) such employees are not entitled to ac-
crue insurance benefits and medical coverage until an initial proba-
126. See supra note 124. 
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tionary period is satisfied;127 b) individuals with non-exemplary 
work histories or criminal records would assume a disproportion-
ately harsh burden;128 and c) intangible factors such as overall 
compatibility with other employees, and level of comfort within 
the particular environment are essential and legitimate bases for 
determining continued employability and can not be immediately 
ascertained.129 These factors are too vague to be subjected to an 
arbitrator's evaluation and decision. 
A preferred approach to any statutory scheme should follow the 
collective bargaining model, excluding managerial and probation-
ary personnel from consideration. 
C. Arbitrator Selection Procedures and Governing Body of Rules 
A noted advantage in arbitration is the ability of the parties to 
select their decision-maker. Most of the unjust discharge legisla-
tion provides specific language on the arbitrator selection process. 
The Michigan and Pennsylvania bills established elaborate proce-
dures to be followed once an employee elected arbitration.130 
The proposed legislative scheme should establish a specific pro-
cedure for selecting an arbitrator, or reference a neutral adminis-
trative agency such as the American Arbitration Association, a 
Public Employment Relations Board or the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service,131 all of which have their own sets of rules 
and procedures. These associations also maintain national panels 
of arbitrators who have been selected based on experience, compe-
tence, and above all, impartiality.132 When an administrative entity 
is referenced in legislation, the entity is authorized to submit a list 
of arbitrators to the employer and the employee. Basic information 
regarding each arbitrator is appended to the list. ISS The parties are 
127. See Mennemeier, Protection From Unjust Discharges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19 
Harv. J. On Legis. 49. 82 (1982). 
128. [d. 
129. [d. 
130. See supra note 124. 
131. Many of these administrative agencies provide an educational function to supple-
ment the systematic framework contained in the rules. 
132. Sanctions, including arbitrator removal, are imposed on those who do not discharge 
their responsibilities fairly and judiciously; the requirement to serve the parties as a judge is 
continuous. 
133. Submission of biographical information will be particularly beneficial to the em-
ployee who does not generally have as much information regarding an arbitrator's back-
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given a specified number of dayslS4 to study the lists, delete names 
objected to, and number the remaining names in preferential or-
der. If a mutual choice is not achieved on the initial list, most of 
the administrative agencies will submit additional lists, or appoint 
a neutral from their national panel, without further imput from 
the parties. 
Once the arbitrator is selected, the parties will require a set of 
rules by which the arbitration proceeding will be governed. The 
model Employment Dispute Arbitration Rules, set forth in the 
Appendix, provide an excellent reference point. 
A packaged procedure, similar to what is commonly found in ar-
bitration generally, is provided by these rules. The only exception 
pertains to the inclusion of a discovery procedure. In arbitration, 
there is no formal discovery device - this allows the parties maxi-
mum discretion in establishing their own guidelines, fashioning a 
proceeding with which they feel most comfortable. Alleged abuses 
or lack of cooperation may be referred to the courts. 
A discovery provision in the employment arbitration context is 
intended to reduce the lawyer's discomfort with the process and to 
ensure that all relevant materials necessary to provide a full and 
fair consideration of the issues is furnished. The arbitrator is the 
sole judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence, and 
any discovery concerns are referred to the arbitrator for a ruling. 
These rulings will be final and binding, not appealable to the 
courts because they are considered interlocutory in nature. Thus, 
the parties are not permitted to unduly or unnecessarily delay the 
proceedings. 
D. Burden and Sufficiency of Proof 
The rules of evidence generally are not applicable in arbitration. 
Under the proposed employment arbitration rules, the state or lo-
cal rules of evidence and the court rules can be used as reference 
points at the discretion of the arbitrator. 
Affecting the substance of the evidence, however, is the burden 
of proof. The procedural informality of arbitration in juxtaposition 
to the more stringent procedural requirements of litigation deter-
ground and general reputation in the community as does the employer. 
134. AAA rules generally allow a response time of seven (7) days, with extensions 
granted for cause. 
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mines and molds the contours of the burden of proof concept. Sev-
eral definitions of burden of proof have evolved. C. Updegraff 
notes: "{BJurden of proof affects the responsibilities of the parties 
in producing evidence: 'primarily, it refers to the duty of proof 
that is logically cast upon any party to establish the basic facts it 
asserts as a basis of claiming belief.' "185 
Others have spoken out against the use of burden of proof con-
cepts in arbitration (except in certain types of discharge cases) and 
have observed: "To insist that the complaining party carries the 
burden of proof is manifestly absurd. Neither side has a burden of 
proof or disproof, but both have an obligation to cooperate in an 
effort to give the arbitrators as much guidance as possible. "186 
Still others, not explicitly recognizing the concept of burden of 
proof, have recognized, as a minimum, that elements of proof need 
to be established: "Of course somebody must prove something to 
the satisfaction of the arbitrator or he will have no alternative 
but to dismiss the complaint or grievance and place the parties 
where he found them. It is more appropriate to say that both par-
ties to an arbitration run the risk of non-persuasion."187 
Generally, where arguments relative to burden of proof prevail, 
they speak only to which party has the ultimate burden of persua-
sion as opposed to the burdens of producing evidence or pleading. 
In discharge and discipline cases in the collective bargaining arena, 
for example, it is an acceptable practice to require the employer to 
move ahead with the production of proofs as it is often only man-
agement that maintains the information needed.188 
The minority viewpoint advances the proposition that in dis-
charge and discipline cases the complainant has the burden of 
proving there was not proper cause to engage in the questioned 
conduct.189 This viewpoint is a by-product of the philosophy which 
dictates that management maintains an inherent right to 
discipline. 
Given the varied points of view which already prevail in arbitra-
tion concerning the burden of proof requirement, these fundamen-
135. C. Updegraff, Arbitration of Labor Disputes 220 (1970). 
136. Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in Arbitration, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 733. 740-42 
(1957). 
137. L. Beatty Labor Management Arbitration Manual 60 (1960). 
138. Scheinman. supra note 136, at 9. 
139. [d. at 10. 
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tal differences must be addressed if at-will disputes are to be dis-
posed of through arbitration. Just cause legislation is not likely to 
incorporate burden of proof requisites. 
Parties could include in their internal personnel management 
documents a "definition" and "scope of application" provision 
which would govern arbitration proceedings conducted in accor-
dance with a statutory mode, or alternatively, they could permit 
the selected arbitrator to use his/her discretion in employing the 
burden formula. This may be the better approach because arbitra-
tors are selected on the basis of their expertise and the reasoned 
judgment they bring to bear on each case. This definition by na-
ture includes the arbitrator's mental thought processes regarding 
the allocation of the burden of proof requirement. 
E. Just Cause Requirement 
As previously indicated, a large body of arbitral precedent exists 
regarding the requirement of just cause. Some commentators have 
suggested that these criteria, though developed and applied in the 
union setting, can be used to resolve wrongful discharge cases.140 A 
concern which arises, however, is whether the labor arbitration 
model can, without modification, be effectively utilized in the em-
ployment dispute setting. Are different standards of criteria 
needed for executive and professionals? If so, these standards of 
review and other limitations will have to be formulated and incor-
porated into the personnel manuals of the employer so that arbi-
140. The seminal arbitration case addressing and defining the just cause concept of ter-
mination involved a unionized situation where management's conduct in discharging an em-
ployee was deemed unjustified. The arbitrator developed a seven-pronged test to be used in 
determining whether discipline, including discharge, was proper: 1. Did the company give to 
the employee warning of the possible or probable disciplinary consequences of the em-
ployee's conduct? 2. Was the company's rule or managerial order reasonably related to (a) 
the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the company's business and (b) the performance 
that the company might properly expect of the employee? 3. Did the company, before ad-
ministering discipline to an employee, make an effort to discover whether the employee did 
in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of management? 4. Was the company's investiga-
tion conducted fairly and objectively? 5. At the investigation did the "judge" obtain sub-
stantial evidence or proof that the employee was guilty as charged? 6. Has the company 
applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination to all em-
ployees? 7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a particular case 
reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee's proven offense and (b) the record 
of the employee in his service with the company? Enterprise Wire Co., 46 LA 359, 362-65 
(1966). 
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trators can apply them accordingly. Absent such limitation, and 
the unlikely event that the statute would provide substantive assis-
tance, arbitrators would have the authority to apply whatever prin-
ciples they deemed essential to a fair resolution of the dispute. 
F. Arbitral Remedies and Penalties 
One of the most unique and salient characteristics of the arbitra-
tion process is the ability of an arbitrator to fashion remedies 
based on the equities and practical considerations of a case. These 
remedies are not necessarily akin to those achieved through court 
proceedings.141 Operating on the likely assumption that the legisla-
tion will not impose limitations on an arbitrator's remedial powers, 
several remedies can be formulated. To make this determination, 
the arbitrator would have to look to the reasonableness of the dis-
ciplinary penalty in light of the character and gravity of the 
conduct. 142 
An arbitrator may: 
a) fully reinstate the employee with full or partial pay back. Reinstate-
ment need not be unconditional. Arbitrators prefer a cautious ap-
proach to discharge cases - if essential to ensure a just result, a 
conditional reinstatement order may be embodied in the award;143 
b) reduce the penalty to a disciplinary suspension, reprimand or warn-
ing. This form of remedial power is comparable to an intermediate 
penalty, with arbitrators guided by a conscience of equity. Based on 
the facts, management's decision to terminate an employee may be 
considered excessive, and thus unjust;!·· 
c) award loss of benefits coupled with reinstatement, forced apologies146 
141. See, e.g., Robins, supra note 11, at 452. 
142. See F. Elkouri & E.A. Elkouri, supra note 120, at 651. 
143. A case instructive on this point is City of Flint and Teamsters Local Union No. 214, 
No. 54-39-1603-76 (Am. Arb. Ass'n. 1977) (Law Enforcement Division). The grievant, a po-
lice officer with the City of Flint, was involved in a shooting accident. She was thereafter 
charged with a crime. Subsequent to her acquittal, she received notice from the Flint Police 
Department that she would be discharged by the City as a consequence of her dismissal 
from the Kalamazoo Regional Police Training Academy. The Arbitrator fashioned a rein-
statement which restored grievant's full seniority. However, he simultaneously noted that 
should the grievant be subject to further withdrawls from the School, she would be deemed 
discharged. Conditional reinstatement normally occurs when an employee is discharged for 
misconduct associated with physical or phychological disability. Arbitrators may require an 
examination by the discharged employee to re-qualify for his position. 
144. See F. Elkouri & E.A. Elkouri, supra note 120, at 651. 
145. [d. See also Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 20 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 823, 826 (1953) 
(RAUCH, ARB.); CRAWFORD CLOTHES, INC., 19 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 475, 481-82 (1952) (KRAMER, 
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or unrecorded suspension.14e 
The question of what remedies are appropriate for wrongful dis-
charge cases remains unanswered. The model rules of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association indicate that an arbitrator is free to 
grant any remedy or relief deemed just and equitable. Unless pro-
scribed by statute, any limitations on the scope of the arbitrator's 
remedy must be contained in the employer's handbooks and per-
sonnel manuals. How much authority is given to an arbitrator may 
determine the likelihood of the passage of just cause legislation. 
From a realistic perspective, it is unlikely that an employer would 
support a statutory scheme that provides carte blanche parameters 
to an arbitrator. Wholesale acceptability of the process and consis-
tency in arbitral decision-making may require that remedies be 
limited to reinstatement and ancillary monetary damages. 
G. Effect of the Award - The Right of Judicial Review 
At the heart of the arbitration process is the concept of finality. 
Most awards are self-enforcing, with the parties voluntarily acting 
out the mandates. The few not properly acknowledged by the par-
ties do not result in de novo review on the merits for "plenary re-
view by a court [of the merits] would make meaningless the provi-
sions that the arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality, it would 
almost never be final. m47 
As in traditional arbitration, the just cause legislation reviewed 
in Part III provided for limited judicial supervision of awards. 
With one exception, an arbitration award would be set aside only: 
1. Where procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; 
2. Where the arbitrators are guilty of misconduct, prejudicing the 
rights of any party; and, 
3. Where the arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction. 
These bases deal with procedural irregularities which affect due 
process and the right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. 
Failure to adhere to the basic guidelines violates guarantees of due 
ARB.). 
146. See F. Elkouri & E.A. Elkouri, supra note 120, at 651. See also Fort Pitt Bridge 
Works, 30 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 633, 635 (1958) (LECHOCZKY, ARB.); IRONITE, INC., 28 LAB. ARB. 
394 (1956) (HAUGHTON, ARB.). 
147. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). 
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process and taints the proceeding and, of course, the resulting 
award. Courts will not tolerate any flagrant abuses, and will inter-
cede if justice so demands. 
Awards can also be vacated if they "manifestly disregard the 
law." This ground has been defined by the federal courts, and re-
cently, by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Only a legal error which 
has led to a substantially different award can be vacated. l4S 
While lack of verbatim records or formal fact-finding and con- . 
elusions of law make review of an arbitration award without specu-
lation difficult or impossible, a reviewing court does not possess the 
authority to unravel the arbitrator's thought process on mere spec-
ulation since there could be several feasible explanations for the 
results. If from the face of the award it can be shown that the arbi-
trators stated the applicable law, and then chose to ignore the law 
in their deliberations, the result represents an abuse of the arbitra-
tion process which, if permitted to stand, undermines the legiti-
macy of arbitral jurisprudence. In this instance, courts have the 
authority to intervene to correct the substantive error. 
The author recognizes that the proposed legislative scheme var-
ies from traditional labor arbitration because, unlike the latter, it 
is not a 'bargained for' result. If arbitration is to have any signifi-
cance, the same standard of review should apply to the wrongful 
discharge case. Both the Michigan and Pennsylvania bills on 
wrongful discharge contained a provision for final and binding ar-
bitration. Judicial review was limited to the common law grounds. 
These bills even went one step further and established a contempt 
procedure - if an employer or employee "willfully" disobeyed or 
refused to adhere to an enforcement order, the court was author-
ized to establish a fine. 
In addition, the Michigan bill established a new test for deter-
mining the viability of arbitral awards. Section thirteen authorized 
review of an award if "not supported by competent, material and 
148. In Hayman Co., v. Brady Mechanical, Inc., 139 Mich. App. 185, 362 N.W.2d 243 
(1984), the appellate court held that the review standard outlined in Detroit Automobile 
Inter-Ins. Exchange v. Gavin, 419 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982) is applicable to all 
statutory arbitration and not limited to auto insurance. The court felt that the standard of 
review set out in GCR 1963, 769 (that a statutory arbitration award can be vacated if "the 
arbitrators exceed their power") required clarification and adopted the "substantial enor 
rule" set out in Howe v. Patrons' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 216 Mich. 560, 183 N.W. 864 (1921). 
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substantial evidence on the whole record. "149 The introduction of 
this new layer of review suggests that a number of residual con-
cerns prevail regarding the use of the process. Nevertheless, inas-
much as arbitration is perceived as, and treated, as an essentially 
equivalent adjudicatory process as that of litigation, it must be al-
lowed to remain, by and large, free from judicial regulation. 
v. SPECULATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
Legal scholars in the field have articulated many predictions re-
garding the immediate future of the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Most of these commentators share the opinion that the traditional 
common law doctrine has been emasculated by the judge made ex-
ceptions addressed in Section II of the Article. 
Other points on which there is philosophical unanimity: 
1. The divergence of views espoused by the courts suggest the need 
for a uniform legislative scheme which would protect non unionized 
employees from arbitrary and retaliatory discharge; 
2. Arbitration, or some other private form of dispute resolution, 
should be invoked as opposed to litigation which is expensive, pro-
tracted, and emotionally traumatizing. 
For this section the author contacted several scholars who have 
published writings on this subject, requesting that they provide 
some thoughts on at-will employment. These "thoughts" follow: 
1. Theodore J. St. Antoine160 
The courts, at least in the more progressive states, have gone 
about as far with unjust discharge actions as they are going to go. 
They will entertain suits alleging serious violations of accepted 
public policy. They will hold employers to their unretracted word 
not to fire except for good reason. But ordinarily they will not im-
149. See supra note 125. This standard of review is employed by the courts in evaluating 
the decisions of administrative agencies such as the Michigan Employment Relations Com-
mission and the National Labor Relations Board. 
150. AB, Fordham College, 1951; JD, University of Michigan, 1954. James E. & Sarah A. 
Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan since 1981; faculty member, U-M Law 
School since 1965; Dean, U-M Law School 1971-78. Past Secretary, ABA Labor Law Section; 
past Chairperson, Michigan Bar Labor Law Section. Current member, Council of ABA La-
bor Law Section and Board of Governors, National Academy of Arbitrators. These com-
ments were excerpted from The Revision of Employment-at- Will Enters A New Phase, 35 
L LJ 563. 565-66. 567 (1985). 
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pose an affirmative obligation on employers to prove just cause to 
support a discharge. They will not subject nonunion firms, as a 
matter of common law, to the same requirement exacted contrac-
tually from nearly every employer party to a collective bargaining 
agreement. The next move is therefore up to the legislatures . . . . 
Employers now are also practicing preventive law. I have men-
tioned the possibility of their purging personnel manuals of poten-
tially troublesome policy statements. Some go so far as to note ex-
plicitly on job applications that any contract entered into will be 
terminable at any time at the employer's sole and absolute discre-
tion. Another device increasingly favored is the severance pay set-
tlement. A discharged employee will be offered a reasonably gener-
ous severence payment, in return for which the worker must waive 
all future claims based on his employment or its termination. My 
·assumption is that all these approaches, if not unconscionably 
overreaching in a particular situation, will be sustained .... 
Protection against unjust discharge is fast acquiring the force of 
a moral and historical imperative. Statutory relief for this long-
neglected abuse of the unorganized worker should now become a 
top item on the agenda of conscientious legislators and the whole 
industrial relations community. The prevention of arbitrary treat-
ment of employees may not only be the humane approach; it may 
also be good business. We lavish attention on the Japanese way of 
management, on the almost paternal relationship between Japa-
nese employers and their employees, and the lifelong careers guar-
anteed many workers in Japanese companies. We should be pre-
pared to entertain the proposition that there may be a marked 
correlation between a secure work force and high productivity and 
quality output. It would be a fine irony if justice was simply the 
frosting on the cake. 
2. Jack Stieberl"l 
This year, as we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Na-
151. CCNY (BSS-40); UNIV. OF MINNESOTA (MA-48); HARVARD UNIV. (PHD-56); PROF. & 
FORMER DlR., SCHOOL OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELs., MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. FORMERLY: 
EXEC., SECY., PRESIDENT'S LABOR-MGMT. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 1962; CHRMN., GOVERNOR'S 
TASK FORCE ON LABOR. 1959; FACULTY, HARVARD Bus. SCHOOL. 1954-56; EXEC. ASST., CIO 
MEMBERS, WAGE STABILIZATION BD. THESE COMMENTS WERE EXCERPTED FROM Legislation: 
The Best Approach to Unjust Dismissal, presented to the National Conference on Employ-
ment-at-Will and Unjust Dismissal (Oct/Nov 1985). 
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tional Labor Relations Act, it is appropriate to look at what the 
Act did not do as well as areas of labor management relations that 
the Act did attempt to regulate. One of the subjects omitted from 
the Act has become the hottest issue in industrial relations, 
namely "wrongful discharge" or "unjust dismissal" of nonunion-
ized employees. 
It is not surprising that the issue of discharge for reasons other 
than union activity was not considered in the National Labor Re-
lations Act of 1935. The idea that an employer should not be able 
to discharge an employee except for just cause would have been 
regarded in 1935 as a gross invasion of management's right to hire 
and fire. Furthermore, consideration of this issue would have vio-
lated the self-imposed prohibition by Congress against dealing 
• 
with the substance as opposed to the procedural aspects of collec-
tive bargaining. 
But this is 1985 not 1935 and times have changed. One indica-
tion of extent to which the courts have changed in their approach 
to the employment-at-will doctrine is the recent decision of the 
Texas Supreme Court in Sabine Pilot Service Inc. v; Hauck. Hav-
ing steadfastly refused to vary from an 1888 decision holding "em-
ployment for an indefinite term may be terminated at will and 
without cause," the concurring opinion, signed by two of the three 
Texas judges sitting in Sabine said: "Absolute employment-at-will 
is a relic of early industrial times, conjuring up visions of the sweat 
shops described by Charles Dickens and his contemporaries. The 
doctrine belongs in a museum, not in our law." 
This was not the court of California, Michigan, New York or 
other so-called liberal states. This was the Supreme Court of Texas 
speaking. Times have certainly changed! But they have not 
changed enough. Furthermore, the change that has occurred in 
court attitudes towards employment-at-will is less significant than 
many commentators would have us believe. In my opinion, the 
courts have gone just about as far as they are prepared to go in 
modifying this century-old common law doctrine. From now on we 
must look to another forum, if we are to do away entirely with 
employment-at-will. That forum is the legislative arena. (empha-
sis added.) 
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3. Robert S. Rosenfeld, Esq. (A Management Perspective)1112 
Maintaining a union-free work force requires both reasonable re-
muneration and fair treatment of employees. To clarify to rank 
and file employees not represented by a labor organization that 
their employment is "at-will" and can be terminated at any time 
with or without notice and with or without cause and without 
outside review likely would raise grave risks of job security con-
cerns on the part of those employees. Job security concerns are a 
major factor leading to union representation. 
This result can be avoided by advising such employees that after 
a probationary period they can be terminated from employment 
only for cause. This statement alone, however, subjects the em-
ployer's decision to discharge to review by judges and juries in 
Michigan. Such review entails costly litigation defense; second-
guessing about the adequacy of the employer's "cause" by a jury 
both untrained in employee relations and presumably sympathetic 
to the discharged employees; disclosure of company records 
through pre-trial discovery; a delayed filing of the action during 
the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim; and, in 
lieu of reinstatement, the risk of damages including lost future 
wages and benefits to an expected retirement age in addition to 
damages for lost past wages and benefits and for pain and suffer-
ing. Such damages frequently accumulate to significant six-fiture 
awards. 
Providing for independent arbitral review avoids the risks at-
tendant litigation. By emulating the union model, arbitration 
avoids the risk of job security concerns and reduces the likelihood 
fo unionization on that account. Review by a professional arbitra-
tor of whether cause exists permits greater predictability of the 
test to be applied and of success by the employer; reinstatement 
replaces lost futures wages and, if awarded, fortifies the employer's 
credibility about desiring to be fair to employees; the remedy is 
more prompt and is less expensive. There is no pre-trial discovery. 
152. "Since 1964, a partner in the Troy, Michigan law finn of Keywell and Rosenfeld, 
which provides labor law services to management clients. He holds a BSE in Industrial En-
gineering, 1954, and an LLB, 1957, from the University of Michigan and an LLM Degree 
from Georgetown University, 1960. From 1960 to 1964, he was an Assistant General Counsel 
of the International Union, UAW. From 1964 to 1975, he served on the labor arbitration 
panels of both the American Arbitration Association and the FMCS. 
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Pertinent time limits and the measures of damages can be defined 
by the employer, as can the rules that would apply in the 
arbitration. 
Presuming rejection of establishing a non-reviewable "at-will" 
employment relationship for rank and file employees, the arbitral 
review of cause is, for these reasons, preferred to the litigation re-
view. Under Michigan law, the arbitral review avoids the judicial 
review. 
4. Robert Howlett, Esq. IIi 8 
The American Common Law "at will" employment doctrine was 
a departure from our English heritage. The rule, originally enunci-
ated at the time of the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century 
(1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (Sharswood ed. 1908», rec-
ognized the doctrine of "reasonable cause" for termination of an 
employee. Early American Courts adopted the English rule. But in 
the late 1880's American law departed from the English rule by 
developing its own version of "at-will" employment. 
In 1877, H.J. Wood wrote a treatise on "Master and Servant" in 
which he spelled out the at-will rule, which has been followed by 
the courts until recently. Wood's theory was that there was no con-
sideration for the employer-employee contract, therefore no mutu-
ality. Either employer or employee could terminate the relation-
ship for any reason at any time. 
The concept that an employee could be terminated for any rea-
son was consistent with the philosophy of most employers at that 
time, i.e., an employee was part of the framework of an enterprise 
and no different than machinery or equipment. 
Today, sixty to sixty-five percent of all American employees are 
hired on an at-will basis; twenty to twenty-two percent are union-
153. --Northwestern Univ. (BS '29); Northwestern Univ. Law Sch. (JD '32). Of counsel, 
Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett. Arbitrated since 1953; Member, Fed. Service Im-
passe Panel, 1982. Formerly: Chrmn., Fed. Servo Impasse Panel, 1982-84 & 1976-78; Chrmn., 
Mich. Employment Rels. Comm., 1964-76; Visiting Prof., Sch. of Indus. Rels., Mich. State 
Univ., 1972-75; Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Mich. Dept. of Aeronautics, 1957-61; Gov's. Comm. 
Consumers Power Co., 1955; Chrmn., Gov's Sp. Comm., Grand Rapids City Coach Lines, 
1955; Presidential Emergency Bd. 176 (Railway Labor Act); Ship Bldg., Comm., NWLB. 
Former Chrmn. & now Pub. Member, Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel. Dir., Ameri-
can Arbitration Ass'n. since 1975. Member, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators (Bd. of Gov's. - 3 
yrs.). 
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ized; fifteen percent are government employees, the latter having 
both constitutional and statutory protection. Other legislation pro-
tects employees from "unjust" situations: Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act (42 USC 2000e); Veterans Reemployment Rights (38 
USC 2021); Section 507 of the Regional Railway Reorganization 
Act of 1973 (45 USC 797m) (45 USC 701 et seq.) which extends the 
right to file grievances over employee protection to unrepresented 
employees; the Occupational Safety and Health Act which prohib-
its the discharge of employees who exercise their rights under the 
Act; and the Whistle Blower Statute (5 USC 1206 (A) (3». 
Many state statutes provide similar protection including the 
Michigan Elliott-Larsen Act, 37 MCLA 2101 et seq. and the Michi-
gan Whistle Blower Statute, MCLA 15.363. 
It is not fair and equitable to provide for all employees the same 
"just cause" protection provided in collective bargaining contracts 
and in statutes directed at specific abuses? Is not discharge for "no 
cause" or "cause morally wrong" or "an unfair reason" a civil right 
or a human right? Is not such a right a proper role for statutory 
enactment? 
The United States of America prides itself as a leading propo-
nent of human rights throughout the world. The record in the em-
ployment relationship does not support our claim. In 1982, the In-
ternational Labor Organization adopted a convention on the 
termination of at-will employees. Representatives of employers 
from only six of the 126 countries involved voted against the con-
vention. The United States was the only country among the 126 
whose government representatives voted against the convention. 
The United States objected to the convention for, among other 
reasons, because it required post-discharge appeal to an impartial 
body where the employer has to put forward some reason for dis-
charge. We pride outs elves on support of human rights and casti-
gate Russia and its satellites for their failure to do so. Just how far 
behind are we in this country? 
Courts do not provide for reinstatement as do collective bargain-
ing contracts and statutes. It is preferable to have "just cause" and 
the procedures to enforce that principle in a statute rather than 
dependency on the sometimes inconsistent rulings of the state 
courts. Would not employers be better off to know the rules rather 
than to risk a lawsuit each time an e~ployee is terminated? Would 
not it be better to have a quasi-judicial procedure by an adminis-
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trative agency or arbitration rather than lengthy, costly litigation. 
Many "unjust discharges" occur in small enterprises, enterprises 
which unions are not interested in organizing for soley economic 
reasons. Larger employers tend to be more sophisticated in their 
treatment of non-supervisory employees. Many have established 
grievance procedures, a few provide for full fledge arbitration. If we 
believe in human rights or civil rights should government not pro-
vide for justice to persons who are treated unfairly? 
5. Sheldon Stark, Esq. (An Individual Perspective)1~4 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Toussaint v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich 579 (1980), limiting the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, added a significant new weapon to the 
arsenal protecting the rights of individuals in the work place. At 
last, nonunion employees were afforded an effective remedy 
against arbitrary discharge despite the absence <?f invidious dis-
crimination, "whistle blowing" or public policy violations by the 
employer. 
In the five and a half years since the unabridged employment-at-
will doctrine "fell", the courts have struggled with establishing the 
contours of the cause of action recognized in Toussiant. On the 
one hand, the remedy has been limited: damages for mental and 
emotional distress in this jurisdiction are not available. On the 
other hand, employers have had their defeats as well: the burden 
of proof has been placed squarely on the employer to establish that 
just cause existed for the discharge. 
While significant issues have been resolved, significant issues re-
main. Does the employer's need for an economic cut-
back-perceived or real-constitute "just cause" for the termina-· 
tion of any specific employee? Does a reduction in force constitute 
154. ** Partner in the Detroit law firm of Stark and Gordon. He specializes in the han-
dling of wrongful discharge, employment discrimination and individual rights cases. He is a 
member of the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity Law of the Section of Labor 
and Employment Law, American Bar Association; Chairman of the Employment Law and 
Intentional Tort Sub-Committee of the Michigan Supreme Court Committee on Standard 
Jury Instructions; a Hearing Referee with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights; Secre-
tary to the Fund for Equal Justice; and a Board Member, Detroit Metropolitan Chapter, 
American Civil Liberties Union. 
** The materials for footnotes 152-54 are not available to or through the DETROIT COL-
LEGE OF LAW REVIEW. 
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an implied exception to the employer's promise to its employees 
that termination will be for cause only? Will the doctrine of "good 
faith and fair dealing" be extended to any other jurisdiction? What 
is the future of "negligent evaluation" as a theory of liability? Will 
"failure to warn" claims be separated out to become an indepen-
dent tort cause of action? 
The employer is entitled to develop policies concerning reduc-
tions in force, to publish them in company manuals, and to dis-
seminate such policies to its employees. It can make the employees 
aware that reductions in force may occur; it can advertise its will-
ingness to act in good faith and with fairness to all; and it can 
adopt a performance appraisal system tied to improving perform-
ance whenever such a policy appears to be in its own interests. Ac-
cordingly, the courts are likely to resolve the suggested issues on 
the basis of the burdens and obligations the employer places or 
fails to place on itself. Many employers will choose to act in ways 
that will limit liability by making no promises or insisting upon 
draconian employment application language. Others will choose to 
enhance employee loyalty, productivity and dedication by making 
promises despite the possibility of litigation. The courts are likely 
to continue requiring that employers simply live up to the 
promises made to the work force. 
Attorneys representing individual employees have welcomed the 
fall of the doctrine of employment-at-will. Unlike union attorneys 
who fear the impact just cause promises will have on union or-
ganizing drives, individual rights attorneys feel the Toussaint case 
fills a terrible void in the legal environment in which their clients 
work and live. 
CONCLUSION 
In speaking some years ago about the landmarks of the law, Ben-
jamin Cardozo observed: "No absolutist is so intrasigent as to as-
sert that there can be literal adherence to a standard of equality or 
liberty. Some compromise is inevitable."llili The genesis, evolution 
and demise of the employment-at-will doctrine exemplifies the na-
ture of this compromise. The doctrine, at one time given constitu-
tional sanctity, presumably a reflection of the turbulent political 
155. Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 128 (M. HALL ED. 1947). 
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era during which it was judicially affirmed, today survives In a 
myriad of forms, absent a constitutional patina. 
It was primarily during the last decade, however, that courts be-
gan to more carefully reflect on the vested interests and competing 
values implicated in the at-will employment issue, endeavoring to 
balance the harm of the displaced employee with the harm to man-
agerial autonomy and the free enterprise system. These judicial re-
flections and meanderings prompted the courts to recognize legiti-
mate exceptions to the strict enforcement of the doctrine. 
But these exceptions have serious limitations. Despite the strides 
which non unionized employees have achieved through decisional 
law, as one scholar recently noted "[t]here is not a square holding 
by any court that an employer may not fire an employee without a 
positive showing of just cause, unless there is a provision to that 
effect. "166 
It does not appear that increased unionization or voluntary em-
ployer action are likely palliatives to counteract the limited judicial 
activism we have witnessed. The labor movement has been stag-
nating for many years, with a steady decrease in membership since 
1975. Voluntary employer action is simply too revolutionary a 
change in the workplace. Employers are not accustomed to dealing 
with encroachments or intrusions on their managerial prerogatives 
and decision-making. 
This situation makes it imperative that just cause legislation be 
enacted to completely eradicate or reduce the philosophical cleav-
age created by judge made law. Although institutional and other 
vested interest groups may interpose obstacles which could hamper 
the immediate passage of legislation, the already overburdened 
courts will find it neither pragmatic nor expeditious to render sub-
stantive decisions concerning wrongful discharge. The volume of 
cases will steadily rise. Courts will become even more paralyzed in 
their efforts to render "complete justice" - the net result may be 
an even greater "emasculation" of the law. 
Just cause legislation with an arbitration component will enable 
the vast majority of workers to have their dismissals reviewed 
before a fair, impartial tribunal. This type of system would go a 
long way toward ensuring that the many injustices associated with 
wrongful discharge are rectified by a meaningful process which ex-
156. St. Antoine, 35 Proceedings Ann. Meeting Indus. Rel. Research A. 564 (1985). 
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tends not only the perception - but the reality - of equity and 
justice. 
APPENDIX 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE 
ARBITRATION RULES 
1. Initiation of Arbitration 
Any party may institute arbitration by filing a complete demand 
for arbitration. That document should stipulate the identity of the 
parties involved, the issues to be determined by the Arbitrator, the 
available remedies, and such other provisions as will assist the Ar-
bitrator in reaching a fair result pursuant to the submission agree-
ment. If an offer of settlement has been made, the offer must ei-
ther be rejected or the period of time provided in the offer for 
acceptance or rejection must elapse prior to filing the demand. 
2. Change of Claim 
Should any party desire to amend their claim, or make a new or 
different claim arising out of the same set of facts against any 
party to the arbitration after filing a claim, such claim shall be 
filed in writing with the AAA, and a copy thereof shall be mailed 
to the other parties who have a period of twenty (20) days from the 
date of such mailing within which to file an answer with the AAA. 
Mter the Arbitrator is appointed, such amendments may not be 
filed without their consent. 
3. Panel of Arbitrators 
The AAA shall maintain a special panel of Arbitrators for pro-
ceedings held pursuant to these Rules, and shall appoint Arbitra-
tors therefrom as hereinafter provided. 
4. Qualifications of Arbitrator 
If the submission agreement of the parties names an Arbitrator 
or specifies a method of selection, the named Arbitrator or the Ar-
bitrator so selected shall be appointed to serve. If the parties have 
not specified a method of selection, the AAA shall submit names to 
them for their mutual selection. If the parties are unable to mutu-
ally select an Arbitrator, the AAA will appoint an Arbitrator, sub-
ject to challenge for justifiable cause. 
5. Disclosure and Challenge Procedure 
Prior to accepting an appointment, the prospective Arbitrator 
shall disclose to the AAA any circumstances likely to prevent a 
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prompt hearing or to create a presumption of bias, including any 
past or present relationship with the parties or their counsel. In 
such cases, the AAA may vacate the appointment, in its discretion. 
6. Vacancy 
If a vacancy occurs or if an appointed Arbitrator is unable to 
serve promptly, a substitute Arbitrator shall be selected in the 
manner set forth for selection of the original Arbitrator. 
7. Time and Place 
Unless stipulated in the submission agreement, the Arbitrator 
shall set the time and place for each hearing. The AAA shall mail 
to each party notice thereof at least five days in advance, unless 
the parties by mutual agreement waive such notice or modify the 
terms thereof. 
8. Representation by Counsel 
Any party may be represented at the hearing by counselor other 
representative. 
9. Discovery 
The right to discovery may be afforded to the parties to the 
same extent that would have been available to the parties had the 
claims been filed in court. If the parties are unable to agree as to 
the scope of discovery, the Arbitrator shall be authorized to rule on 
such questions, bearing in mind the need to provide a full and fair 
consideration of the relevant and material facts of the case. Appro-
priate safeguards of the confidentiality of information discovered 
may be imposed by the Arbitrator. 
10. Attendance at Hearings 
The parties and their attorneys are entitled to attend hearings. 
The Arbitrator may require the retirement of any witness during 
the testimony of other witnesses. Other persons shall be excluded 
from the hearings at the request of a party. 
11. Adjournments 
The Arbitrator may take adjournments upon the request of a 
party or upon the Arbitrator's own initiative but must take such 
adjournment when all parties agree thereto. 
12. Oaths 
Before proceeding with the first hearing, the Arbitrator shall 
take an oath of office. The Arbitrator shall require witnesses to tes-
tify under oath. 
13. Stenographic Record 
Either party may request a stenographic record and make ar-
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rangements for same through the AAA. A copy of the transcript 
must be made available to the Arbitrator, and to the other party 
for inspection. If the parties both request such a record or if the 
record is requested only by the employer, the cost of the record 
shall be borne by the employer. If the record is requested only by 
the claimant, the cost of the record shall be borne equally by the 
parties. 
14. Order of Proceedings 
A hearing shall be opened by the filing of the oath of the Arbi-
trator and by the recording of the place, time and date of the hear-
ing and the presence of the Arbitrator, parties and counsel, and by 
the receipt by the Arbitrator of the submission agreement contain-
ing a description of the controversy. 
The Arbitrator may, at the beginning of the hearing, ask for 
statements clarifying the issues involved. 
The complaining party shall then present claims, proofs, and 
witnesses, who shall submit to questions or other examination. The 
Arbitrator may vary this procedure, but shall afford full and equal 
opportunity to all parties for the presentation of any material or 
relevant proofs. 
Exhibits, when offered by either party, may be received in evi-
dence by the Arbitrator. 
The names and addresses of all witnesses, and exhibits in order 
received, shall be made a part of the record. 
The Arbitrator shall retain records of the proceedings. For good 
cause shown, the Arbitrator may schedule additional hearings. 
15. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party 
The arbitration may proceed in the absence of any party who, 
after due notice, fails to be present. An award shall not be made 
solely on the default of a party. The Arbitrator shall require the 
attending parties to submit supporting evidence. 
16. Evidence 
Unless the parties provide otherwise in their submission agree-
ment, the Arbitrator shall be the sole judge of the relevancy and 
materiality of the evidence offered. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
shall be used as a guide by the Arbitrator in that connection, but 
shall not be binding. . 
17. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of Documents 
The Arbitrator may receive and consider evidence in the form of 
an affidavit, but shall give appropriate weight to any objections 
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made. All documents to be considered by the Arbitrator shall be 
filed at the hearing or pursuant to arrangements set forth at the 
hearing which allow review and rebuttal by the opposing side. 
18. Close of Hearings 
The Arbitrator shall ask whether the parties have any further 
proofs to offer or witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving negative 
replies, the Arbitrator shall declare and note the hearing closed. 
19. Briefs 
Unless the parties have waived the right to file written briefs, 
they may be filed within seven days of the close of the hearing 
unless the parties mutually agree upon a different schedule. 
20. Extensions of Time 
The parties may modify any period of time by mutual agree-
ment. The AAA for good cause may extend any period of time es-
tablished by these Rules, except the time for making the award. 
The AAA shall notify the parties of any such extension of time and 
its reason therefore. 
21. Waiver of Rules 
Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after knowledge 
that any provision or requirement of these Rules has not been 
complied with, and who fails to state objections thereto in writing, 
shall be deemed to have waived the right to object. 
22. Serving of Notices 
Any papers or process, necessary or proper for the initiation or 
continuation of an arbitration under these Rules, for any court ac-
tion in connection therewith, or for the entry of judgment on an 
award made thereunder, may be served upon such party by mail 
addressed to such party or its attorney at its last known address, 
or by personal service, or in any manner permitted by law. 
23. Time of Award 
The award shall be rendered promptly by the Arbitrator and, 
unless otherwise mutually agreed by the parties, not later than 
thirty (30) days from the date of the closing of the hearing. 
24. Scope of Award 
The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that a court hav-
ing jurisdiction of the matter could grant, provided it is within the 
scope of the parties' submission agreement. However, unless the 
parties specifically provide otherwise in their submission 
agreement: 
(a) The relief granted must be for the direct benefit of the claim-
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ing party only. 
(b) Relief may not be awarded for the benefit of any similarly 
situated individual(s), groups, or classes. 
(c) No punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded. 
. Unless the submission to arbitration otherwise provides, the Ar-
bitrator is authorized to determine as part of the award whether 
the employer should pay a prevailing claimant's reasonable attor-
ney's fees and expenses for representation in the arbitration. 
25. Form of Award 
The award shall be in writing and shall be signed by the Arbitra-
tor. Unless the parties otherwise provide in their submission agree-
ment, the award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding, the 
parties shall comply with its terms forthwith, and a judgment of a 
court having jurisdiction may be entered upon the award. 
26. Award Upon Settlement 
If the parties settle their dispute during the course of the arbi-
tration, the Arbitrator, upon their request, may set forth the terms 
of the agreed settlement in an award. 
27. Delivery of Award to Parties 
Parties shall accept as legal delivery of the award the placing of 
the award or a true copy thereof in the mail bytheAAA.ad-
dressed to a party at its last known address, or to its attorney, or 
personal service of the award, or the filing of the award in any 
manner which may be permitted by law. 
28. Release of Documents for Judicial Proceedings 
The AAA shall, upon the written request of a party, furnish to 
such party, at the party's expense, certified facsimiles of any pa-
pers in the AAA's possession that may be required in judicial pro-
ceedings relating to the arbitration. 
29. Applications to Court and Exclusion of Liability 
(a) No judicial proceedings by a party relating to the subject 
matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a waiver of the party's 
right to arbitrate. 
(b) Neither the AAA nor any Arbitrator in a proceeding under 
these Rules is a necessary party in judicial proceedings relating to 
the arbitration. 
(c) Parties to these Rules shall be deemed to have consented 
that judgement upon the arbitration award may be entered in any 
Federal or State Court having jurisdiction thereof. 
(d) Neither the AAA nor any Arbitrator shall be liable to any 
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party for any act or omission in connection with any arbitration 
conducted under these Rules. 
30. Expenses 
The expenses of witnesses shall be paid by the party producing 
such witnesses. 
31. Interpretation and Application of Rules 
The Arbitrator shall interpret and apply these Rules insofar as 
they relate to the Arbitrator's power and duties. All other Rules 
shall be interpreted and applied by the AAA. 
